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Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics 
†Stefan Th. Gries∗ & Brian G. Slocum∗∗ 
This Article discusses how corpus analysis, and similar empirically 
based methods of language study, can help inform judicial assessments 
about language meaning. We first briefly outline our view of legal 
language and interpretation in order to underscore the importance of 
the ordinary meaning doctrine, and thus the relevance of tools such as 
corpus analysis, to legal interpretation. Despite the heterogeneity of the 
judicial interpretive process, and the importance of the specific context 
relevant to the statute at issue, conventions of meaning that cut across 
contexts are a necessary aspect of legal interpretation. Because ordinary 
meaning must in some sense be generalizable across contexts, it would 
seem to be subject in some way to the empirical verification that corpus 
analysis can provide. 
We demonstrate the potential of corpus analysis through the study of 
two rather infamous cases in which the reviewing courts made various 
general claims about language meaning. In both cases, United States v. 
Costello and Smith v. United States, the courts made statements about 
language that are contradicted by corpus analysis. We also demonstrate 
the potential of corpus analysis through Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park 
hypothetical. A discussion of how to approach Hart’s hypothetical shows 
the potential but also the complexities of the kind of linguistic analyses 
required by such scenarios. Corpus linguistics can yield results that are 
relevant to legal interpretation, but performing the necessary analyses is 
complex and requires significant training in order to perform 
competently. We conclude that while it is doubtful that judges will 
themselves become proficient at corpus linguistics, they should 
be  receptive to the expert testimony of corpus linguists in approp-
riate circumstances. 
 
 †  The order of authors is alphabetical. 
 ∗  Stefan Th. Gries, Professor of Linguistics, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
 ∗∗  Brian G. Slocum, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School 
of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A characteristic feature of legal texts is that they employ natural 
language in order to accomplish their purposes.1 If one assumes that 
successful communication is the goal in most cases (especially where 
notice is important, as with criminal statutes), then these texts 
 
 1.  See generally HEIKKI E.S. MATTILA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL LINGUISTICS 
(Christopher Goddard trans., 2d ed. 2013) (examining the functions and characteristics of 
legal language and the terminology of law). 
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should be understood by different people, including the general 
public, in the same way.2 Such a goal requires that, absent some 
reason for deviation, such as words with technical or special legal 
meanings, the language used in legal texts should be viewed as 
corresponding with the language used in nonlegal communications.3 
Indeed, the ‘ordinary meaning’ doctrine, fundamental to legal 
interpretation, reflects the presumption that legal and nonlegal 
language correspond.4 Should it follow, then, that a fluent English-
speaking layperson is as qualified as a judge to determine the 
meaning of a legal provision? Most might intuitively answer “no,” 
but on what basis is a judge better qualified to determine the 
meaning of English sentences? Certainly, we can expect that a judge 
would understand the legal effects of a provision, and a layperson 
might not, but understanding the legal effects of a provision is 
distinct from an understanding of the meaning of its terms. Thus, to 
borrow from a much-discussed case involving a claim of breach of 
contract, understanding the meaning of sandwich, and whether the 
concept normally includes within its scope burritos and tacos, is 
different from understanding the legal effects of a determination that 
a burrito is a sandwich.5 
Notwithstanding the difference between legal effects and 
meaning (as an abstract matter, at least), legal interpretation is an 
intricate process that depends crucially on the context surrounding a 
given provision, requiring an understanding of such things as 
precedent, related provisions, interpretive rules specific to law, and 
 
 2.  See Herman Cappelen, Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues, in CONTEXT 
SENSITIVITY AND SEMANTIC MINIMALISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS, 3, 
17 (Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter eds., 2007) (“When we articulate rules, directives, laws and 
other action-guiding instructions, we assume that people, variously situated, can grasp that 
content in the same way.”). 
 3.  See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963). 
 4.  We are using double quotes for quotations, single quotes for meanings and 
concepts, and italics for mentions of words as exemplified in the following sentence: The word 
run can mean ‘to go faster than a walk.’ 
 5.  This question arose under a contract between a Panera Bread restaurant and a 
shopping center that prohibited the shopping center from leasing space to any restaurant 
“reasonably expected to have annual sales of sandwiches” exceeding ten percent of the 
restaurant’s income. White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rests., LLP, No. 2006196313, 2006 
WL 3292641, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006). 
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the legal effects of any potential interpretation.6 This knowledge—
not normally possessed by a layperson—helps to distinguish legal 
interpretation from other kinds of nonlegal interpretation. 
Nevertheless, pursuant to the ordinary meaning doctrine, judges 
endemically make claims about language in legal texts that are 
general in nature and not specific to the law. For example, the 
Supreme Court has decided multiple cases requiring it to make 
assertions about the meaning of use in relation to a criminal 
sentencing provision that provides for an enhanced punishment if 
the defendant “uses” a firearm “during and in relation to . . . [a] 
drug trafficking crime.”7 Similarly, Judge Posner, writing for the 
Seventh Circuit, made general claims about the meaning of harbors 
in interpreting a statute providing criminal penalties for anyone who 
“conceals, harbors or shields from detection” an alien who “has 
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of 
law.”8 In fact, one of the most famous legal hypotheticals, H. L. A. 
Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park scenario, illustrates the fuzziness of 
natural language terms such as vehicle.9 
Legal interpretation therefore cannot be reduced to an exercise 
in lexical semantics (i.e., the study of word meaning), but, at the 
same time, lexical semantics and other aspects of language are 
integral to legal interpretation. As such, inaccurate judicial assertions 
about language, which various scholars have catalogued, sometimes 
result in interpretations that might not have been selected absent 
incorrect understandings of language.10 These inaccurate assertions 
are often based on faulty judicial intuitions or incorrect use of 
 
 6.  For an excellent overview of legal interpretation, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2016). 
 7.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993), superseded by statute, 
Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469; see infra Part IV (describing the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012)).  
 8.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1041 (7th Cir. 2012); see infra Part III 
(describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Costello, 666 F.3d 1040). 
 9.  See infra V (discussing the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical). The term fuzziness 
is used in linguistics and philosophy of language to describe the boundaries of categories (such 
as vehicle) that are “ill-defined, rather than sharp.” M. LYNNE MURPHY & ANU KOSKELA, KEY 
TERMS IN SEMANTICS 72 (2010); see infra notes 172–175 and accompanying text (discussing 
fuzziness in word meanings). 
 10.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993). For example, 
the book discusses the tendency of judges to declare statutory language to be “plain” when, in 
reality, it is general and vague. See id. at 99–117. 
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external sources of linguistic information, such as dictionaries.11 
Recently, some scholars have advocated that courts would be better 
served by engaging in corpus-linguistics analysis of relevant statutory 
and constitutional texts.12 Corpus linguistics is the study of language 
based on large collections of language use stored in corpora, which 
are computerized databases created for linguistic research. 
Undoubtedly, corpus analysis can reveal insights about language 
usage and meaning. Furthermore, the use of corpora, and similar 
empirically based methods of language analysis, may help courts 
make accurate assertions about the ordinary meaning of language. 
This Article demonstrates how corpus analysis, and similar 
empirically based methods of language study, can help inform 
judicial assessments about language meaning. First, we briefly outline 
our view of legal language and interpretation in order to 
demonstrate the importance of the ordinary meaning doctrine, and 
thus the relevance of tools such as corpus analysis, to legal 
interpretation. Part I argues that despite the heterogeneity of the 
current judicial interpretive process, and the importance of the 
specific context relevant to the statute at issue, conventions of 
meaning that cut across contexts are a necessary aspect of legal 
interpretation. Indeed, such conventions are an important aspect of 
the sequential nature of legal interpretation, whereby a court first 
determines the ordinary meaning of the textual language and then 
(1) accepts that meaning as the legal meaning of the text, (2) rejects 
it in favor of an unordinary meaning, or (3) precisifies it in some way 
because the ordinary meaning is indeterminate in relation to the 
interpretive question before the court. Nevertheless, as Part II 
discusses, the constituent question of what makes some permissible 
meaning the ordinary meaning is an inherently normative issue that 
courts typically, and incorrectly, treat as self-evident. Corpus analysis 
can provide valuable insights about language usage but cannot by 
itself resolve normative issues. 
Parts III and IV demonstrate the potential of corpus analysis, 
and similar empirically based methods of language analysis, through 
the study of two rather infamous cases in which the reviewing courts 
 
 11.  For a criticism of how judges use dictionaries, see Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the 
Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998). 
 12.  Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
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made various general claims about language meaning. In both cases, 
United States v. Costello13 and Smith v. United States,14 the courts 
made statements about language that are contradicted by 
corpus  analysis. 
Part V demonstrates the potential of corpus analysis through 
Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical. A discussion of how to 
approach Hart’s hypothetical shows the potential but also the 
complexities of the linguistic analyses required by such scenarios.15 
Corpus linguistics can yield results that are relevant to legal 
interpretation, but performing the necessary analyses is complex and 
requires significant training in order to perform them competently. 
We conclude that while it is doubtful that judges will themselves 
become proficient at corpus linguistics, they should be receptive to 
the expert testimony of corpus linguists in appropriate circumstances. 
I. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AS A SOURCE FOR ORDINARY MEANING 
A. The Heterogeneity of Legal Interpretation 
Legal interpretation is heterogeneous in ways that should be 
accounted for when considering the value of language insights from 
corpus linguistics. One of the most frequently discussed areas of 
divergence involves the very question of how courts should approach 
the interpretation of legal texts. While a variety of interpretive 
methodologies have been suggested, the basic division is between 
judges who privilege the linguistic meaning of the legal text (known 
as textualists) and judges who privilege the intention or purpose of 
the legislative body that enacted the text (known as intentionalists).16 
A somewhat analogous language distinction (which will be discussed 
throughout this Article) between “semantics” and “pragmatics” is 
 
 13.  Costello, 666 F.3d 1040. 
 14.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469. 
 15.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 36–39 (2012). 
 16.  For a description and critique of textualism and intentionalism, see generally 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 
(2009). For purposes of this Article, intentionalism and purposivism are viewed as synonymous 
and the terms are used interchangeably. Although some may argue that intentionalism and 
purposivism are distinct methodologies of interpretation, any differences between the two are 
not relevant to the arguments made in this Article. 
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made by linguists and philosophers. With some simplification, 
semantics accounts for linguistic phenomena by relating, via the rules 
of the language and abstracting away from specific contexts, 
linguistic expressions to the world objects to which they refer.17 A 
semantic meaning is thus one based on decoding and not intent 
determining.18 In contrast to semantics, pragmatics accounts for 
linguistic phenomena by reference to the language user (producer or 
interpreter), and involves inferential processes.19 The traditional view 
is that pragmatics takes as input the semantic contents of sentences 
uttered in contexts.20 After identifying the semantic content of an 
utterance, pragmatic principles are used for comprehension.21 
Context is thus centrally involved in explaining how pragmatics 
complements semantics.22 
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of interpretive method-
ologies, it may seem uncontroversial that linguistic insights from 
corpora should be deemed relevant to the questions courts ask (even 
if implicitly) when interpreting legal texts. For textualists, the 
relevance of linguistic insights from corpora seems obvious. 
Textualism advocates that judges “should seek statutory meaning in 
the semantic import of the enacted text.”23 If the “semantic import” 
of the enacted language is of crucial importance to the court, it 
follows that generalizations about language usage (which corpus 
linguistics can provide) would be useful to interpreters. Compared to 
textualist judges, it is less intuitive that corpus linguistics should be 
relevant to intentionalist or purposivist judges. After all, such judges 
 
 17.  See MIRA ARIEL, DEFINING PRAGMATICS 24 (2010). 
 18.  See id. 
 19.  See id. at 4–8, 28. 
 20.  See FRANCOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 21 (2004). 
 21.  An utterance is simply a “specific, concrete instance of language use.” MURPHY & 
KOSKELA, supra note 9, at 167. It “can be taken to include both spoken and written language 
use.” Id. 
 22.  See id. Pragmatics is thus concerned with whatever information is relevant to 
understanding an utterance, even if such information is not reflected in the syntactic properties 
of the sentence. For example, one kind of pragmatic process, conversational implicature, 
involves “any meaning or proposition expressed implicitly by a speaker in his or her utterance 
of a sentence which is meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense.” Yan Huang, 
Implicature, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 156 (Yan Huang ed., 2017). Thus, 
when a speaker utters the sentence, “The soup is warm,” the speaker conversationally 
implicates an augmented meaning, namely that ‘the soup is not hot.’ See id.  
 23.  John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 
1288 (2010). 
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purport to interpret statutes in light of the legislature’s intent or 
purpose. Even so, a common sentiment is that intentionalists and 
purposivists have “more or less adopted textualist practices as their 
first plan of attack.”24 Furthermore, courts in general often state that 
the ordinary meaning of the statutory text is the “best evidence” of 
legislative intent or purpose.25 Thus, generalizations about language 
usage should also be useful to intentionalist judges, even if they 
may  not always be viewed by intentionalists as conclusive of 
statutory meaning. 
Not surprisingly, given the influence of textualism since the 
1980s, the idea that textual language should be given its ordinary 
meaning is more frequently invoked now than in the past.26 The 
basic premise of the ordinary meaning doctrine is that a legal text is a 
form of communication that uses natural language in order to 
accomplish its purposes. Thus, for various reasons including rule of 
law and notice concerns, textual language should be interpreted in 
light of the accepted and typical standards of communication that 
apply outside of the law.27 Identifying the ordinary meaning of the 
language in a legal text is therefore a purely linguistic matter. The 
legal concerns of the judge are ostensibly not relevant to the 
determination, although these legal concerns might influence the 
ultimate meaning the court chooses.28 
Notwithstanding the presumption that textual language should 
be given its ordinary meaning, heterogeneity in interpretation exists 
(and would even if all judges agreed to apply the same interpretive 
 
 24.  David K. Ismay & M. Anthony Brown, The Not So New Textualism: A Critique of 
John Manning’s Second Generation Textualism, 31 J.L. & POL. 187, 192 (2015). 
 25.  Sayles v. Thompson, 457 N.E.2d 440, 448 (Ill. 1983) (“The ordinary meaning of 
the language employed by the drafters in the questioned constitutional or statutory clause 
provides the best evidence of the drafters’ intent.”); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air 
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (“Statutory construction must begin with the 
language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 26.  See Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1610 (2012); see also infra note 82. Scalia and 
Garner refer to the ordinary meaning doctrine as “the most fundamental semantic rule of 
interpretation.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 69. 
 27.  See BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (2015). 
 28.  See Brian G. Slocum, The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation, in THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 14,16 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017). 
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methodology) due to the significant contribution that context makes 
to meaning. Any theory of interpretation should recognize that the 
linguistic meaning of a legal text is not limited to the semantic 
meaning of its language but rather includes the pragmatic processes 
necessary to identify the meaning of the legislative utterances.29 
While semantic meaning must in some ways account for context, 
identifying the meaning of a legislative utterance requires particular 
consideration of context.30 In fact, semantic meaning and contextual 
cues often have a symbiotic relationship. Scholars have demonstrated 
that efficient communication systems will contain ambiguity as long 
as context is informative about meaning.31 Disambiguation occurs 
because “comprehenders are able to quickly use contextual 
information in the form of discourse context . . . , local linguistic 
context . . . , or more global world knowledge.”32 An efficient 
communication system may thus produce ambiguous language when 
it is examined out of context but “will not convey information 
already provided by the context.”33 
The context in which the legislature enacted a statute is therefore 
crucial to interpretation, making meaning inherently contextual and 
dependent on the specific features of the particular context in any 
given case. In legal cases, the contextual evidence that must be 
considered is often vast and nuanced, requiring multiple inferences 
about meaning.34 Even assuming that contextual cues are indicative 
of meaning, as in nonlegal communication, legal cases involve 
normative judgments about possible inferences from the context that 
are not relevant to nonlegal interpretation. (For example, can 
 
 29.  See Scott Soames, Deferentialism, Living Originalism, and the Constitution, in THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 218, 218–19 (Brian G. Slocum 
ed., 2017). 
 30.  Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (“[S]tatutory interpretation turns on 
‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole’ . . . .” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 
341 (1997))). 
 31.  Steven T. Piantadosi, Harry Tily & Edward Gibson, The Communicative Function 
of Ambiguity in Language, 122 COGNITION 280, 280 (2012). 
 32.  Id. at 289. 
 33.  Id. at 282. 
 34.  Consider, for example, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s recent book, Reading 
Law: The Interpretation of Texts, which lists dozens of principles and canons of interpretation, 
all of which relate in some way to the context of the statute. SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 15. 
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evidence from legislative history be considered and is it sometimes 
persuasive?) Furthermore, even if a judge adheres to a particular 
methodology of interpretation, it may not be predictable how that 
judge will weigh the often conflicting sources of meaning. The judge 
might find evidence from legislative history (or a textual canon, 
dictionary definition, or any number of other determinants of 
meaning) persuasive in one case but not another, while another 
judge using the same sources and considering the same evidence 
might reach a different conclusion.35 Legal interpretation can thus be 
seen as a very personal, a perhaps idiosyncratic, endeavor. 
The relevant contextual considerations in legal interpretation are 
thus intensely legal in nature, involving various background 
interpretive principles as well as the remainder of the corpus juris.36 
Legal interpretation is an inherently legal process and not one 
designed to determine meaning as one would outside of the law (as 
in a private correspondence, for example).37 Courts do not seek the 
general meaning of a word (or even a sentence); instead, they seek 
something broader and more along the lines of what a reasonable 
person would take the author to be conveying by the chosen 
language in the given communicative context.38 Because the process 
 
 35.  No methodology of interpretation, such as textualism or intentionalism, has been 
sufficiently developed so that it contains precise instructions regarding under what 
circumstances a particular interpretive principle should be applied and how it should be 
applied. Even if such instructions existed, they would necessarily be sufficiently general so that 
heterogeneity of results would still obtain. 
 36.  See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991) (“Where a 
statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that 
permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both 
previously and subsequently enacted law. . . . We do so . . . because it is our role to make sense 
rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079, as recognized in Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 37.  Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist 
Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within 
Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 707 (2014) (“Modern textualists emphasize that Congress 
invariably legislates against the background of a number of linguistic and cultural 
understandings that influence, and indeed determine, what a linguistically competent person 
would understand a statute to say.”). 
 38.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 417–18 (1899) (indicating that the interpreter’s role is not to ask what the author meant 
to convey but instead determine “what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal 
speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used.”); see also Fallon, 
supra note 37, at 703 (arguing that “[o]nce an interpretive context is specified, both 
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must take account of various considerations unique to the law, 
nonlegal generalizations about language usage are seen by some to 
be relatively unimportant if not irrelevant.39 In this light, the focus of 
concern in legal interpretation should be on how best to account for 
the ways in which context shapes meaning rather than how to find 
generalizations about language that cut across contexts. 
B. Ordinary Meaning as a Necessary Component of Legal Meaning 
Judicial practice and the very nature of legal interpretation 
complicate the above described context-centric view of interpre-
tation. For instance, the rule of law requires that governing rules 
provide advance notice to enable people to plan their affairs with 
knowledge of the legal consequences of their actions.40 Thus, despite 
the context-sensitive nature of natural language communication, a 
basic assumption of at least some legal texts (e.g., criminal statutes) 
is that they should be understood by different people, including the 
general public, in the same way and the understanding should be 
based on the semantic meaning of the language.41 Such an 
assumption suggests that these texts should be interpreted according 
to standards of communication that give texts readily discernible 
meanings based on a somewhat limited consideration of context.42 
Even if one discounts the influence of the rule of law on legal 
interpretation, it seems implausible that courts would systematically 
disregard the semantic meanings of words. Indeed, it is difficult to 
conceive of a realistic interpretive methodology in which the 
semantic meanings of the words did not generally act (at the least) as 
a constraint on permissible  interpretations.43 
 
[textualists and purposivists] rely on a largely unanalyzed notion of reasonableness to 
determine ultimate meaning.”). 
 39.  See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, On Whose Authority?: Linguists’ Claim of Expertise to 
Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1034 (1995) (arguing that “[w]hen judges say 
plain meaning, they may not mean plain meaning in a sense that linguists would recognize as 
ordinary language.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 40.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ‘‘The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997). 
 41.  See Cappelen, supra note 2. 
 42.  Notice is especially important in some areas, such as with criminal statutes. See 
Fallon, supra note 40, at 48. 
 43.  See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 91. Of course, it is possible to point to 
interpretations where the linguistic meaning of the text did not act as a constraint on the 
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To illustrate, consider H. L. A. Hart’s famous hypothetical 
involving a rule that “forbids you to take a vehicle into the public 
park.”44 Suppose a case arises in which a citation is given to a person 
walking his dog through the park. There have been several dog 
attacks in the park (some might even say that it has been an 
epidemic), and the dog at issue is a member of the breed that has 
been responsible for the majority of the attacks. The court, 
considering purpose at a high level of generality, decides that the 
protection of park users (the identified purpose of the provision) 
dictates that certain dangerous breeds of dogs fall within the scope of 
the provision. The court thus determines that the dog in question is 
a “vehicle” within the meaning of the statute. 
The court’s decision in the above case, even if well-intentioned, 
would likely be harshly criticized by many commentators. Under 
common usage, a dog is clearly not a vehicle, and there is no 
plausible argument that dogs are even borderline cases of vehicles, as 
any empirical investigation would no doubt confirm.45 Critics would 
likely argue that the court’s decision fails to adhere to important rule 
of law principles. These criticisms would be made even if the case did 
not involve a situation in which notice would be particularly 
important. To disregard the text of the law, by ignoring the principle 
that words have ordinary and ascertainable meanings, would be to 
fail to comply with rule of law principles.46 This line of criticism 
would likely hold even if the court could find some evidence that the 
legislative intent was that “vehicle” in the provision should have a 
very broad meaning.47 Indeed, the criticisms reflect an underlying 
belief, captured by the ordinary meaning doctrine, that the meaning 
lexicalized by a word (i.e., its semantic meaning) is generalizable 
across contexts, not based on any specific interpretive clues that can 
 
interpretation chosen by the court. The exceptions do not, however, undermine the generality 
that linguistic meaning acts (at least) as a constraint on possible legal meaning. 
 44.  H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607 (1958). 
 45.  Of course, the issue might be closer if the dog was transporting someone (perhaps a 
small child) on its back. Nevertheless, it is not a controversial claim that there exist objects that 
clearly are not vehicles. 
 46.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at xxix, 4 (arguing that courts should act as 
faithful agents of the legislature, which includes an acceptance that “words convey 
discernible meanings”). 
 47.  Obviously, the legislature can stipulate an unordinary meaning in the text of the 
statute, which a court would be bound to implement. 
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be traced to the drafter of the text. Under a mainstream view of 
lexical semantics, and consistent with Hart’s analysis, knowledge of 
the semantic meaning of a word like vehicle may not resolve all 
interpretive disputes, because the inherent fuzziness of words means 
that there will be uncertainties regarding the word’s scope of domain 
(i.e., the objects to which the word should be applied).48 
Nevertheless, the semantic meaning can fairly rule out some objects 
(like dogs) as being vehicles. 
The picture of legal interpretation that should emerge is one in 
which the interpreter determines meaning on the basis of various 
interpretive tools, most of which are based on conventions of 
meaning or other principles resting on generalized assumptions 
about language usage.49 Still, while the interpreter must determine 
the meaning of the text on the basis of the words used and their 
composition, the consideration of context is crucial to meaning, 
both within and outside of law.50 In general, 
[a] typical author in typical circumstances is motivated to exploit 
external factors in order to provide the interpreter with sufficiently 
clear evidence that will enable the interpreter to interpret the 
inscription as intended. In fact, the author cannot reasonably 
expect the interpreter to recognize the intended meaning unless 
the author believes that sufficient cues exist and are available to the 
interpreter to determine the meaning.51 
Nevertheless, the context available in interpreting legal texts may 
often be multivocal and involves normative judgments about 
whether a possible determinant (e.g., legislative history) may 
be considered. 
The interpretive process thus involves a mix of determinants of 
meaning, all of which relate in some way to the relevant statute, 
whether the relation is to the statute’s language or the circumstances 
 
 48.  See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text (discussing fuzziness in 
word meanings). 
 49.  See generally SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 2–3 (describing the determinants of the 
ordinary meaning doctrine, which are all dependent on generalized assumptions about 
language usage). 
 50.  MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 9, at 36 (“The principle of compositionality states 
that the meaning of a complex linguistic expression is built up from the meanings of its 
composite parts in a rule-governed fashion.” Thus, a sentence is compositional if its meaning is 
the sum of the meanings of its parts and of the relations of the parts.). 
 51.  SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 93. 
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surrounding the statute’s enactment. Legislative history, for example, 
allows the interpreter to consider the particular context surrounding 
the enactment of a statute and make inferences about legislative 
intent based on that evidence.52 Other determinants depend 
primarily on the systematicities of language rather than multiple 
interpretive clues drawn from the particular context of a statute.53 
The ordinary meaning doctrine acts as an umbrella concept that 
encompasses various such determinants.54 Dictionaries are an 
obvious, and commonly used, example. A dictionary definition is 
considered useful, not because it reveals some particular legislative 
intent, but rather because of both the (often mistaken) belief that 
the definition provides the ordinary meaning of the relevant word 
and the correlative generalized presumption that the legislature 
intended for the word to be given its ordinary meaning. However, 
dictionaries, in general, list words as a set of isolated items, and 
dictionary definitions cannot account for the particular context of 
the provision at issue.55 
Notwithstanding the existence of determinants of meaning that 
relate to the particularized context of a statute, such as legislative 
history, it is not surprising that courts consistently state that the 
words of the text, and the ordinary meaning of those words, are the 
surest, safest evidence of a legislature’s intentions.56 As previously 
indicated, people are generally motivated to choose words that 
express their intended meaning.57 Due to the multivocal nature of 
contextual evidence relating to actual authorial intent, discerning 
that intent apart from the ordinary meaning of the words used is an 
uncertain proposition.58 Despite the importance of context, 
 
 52.  For an analysis of legislative history, see, for example, James J. Brudney & Corey 
Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the 
Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220 (2006); Charles Tiefer, The 
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205. 
 53.  See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 213–76 (discussing ordinary meaning and lexical 
semantics in legal interpretation). 
 54.  See generally SLOCUM, supra note 27 (analyzing the various interpretive principles 
that can be said to determine ordinary meaning). 
 55.  See M. A. K. HALLIDAY & COLIN YALLOP, LEXICOLOGY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 
24–25 (2007). 
 56.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 57.  SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 98. 
 58.  See John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1947 
(2015) (analyzing the difficulties of ascertaining legislative intent). 
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determinants of meaning that relate only superficially (or partially) to 
the particularized context of the provision and depend on 
generalized assumptions about legislative intent, such as dictionaries, 
can be valuable tools of legal interpretation.59 They must, however, 
be combined with an examination of the particularized context of 
the statute in order to fix the meaning of the relevant provision. 
C. Ordinary Meaning and Sequential Interpretation 
The heterogeneity of the determinantes of legal meaning makes 
the justificatory requirements of legal interpretation critical. By 
distinguishing between semantics and pragmatics, language theorists 
can more perspicuously address both the conventions and 
systematicities of language (i.e., semantics) and the inferential 
processes involved in determining a speaker or author’s meaning 
(i.e., pragmatics).60 In a similar way, the sequential process of 
statutory interpretation allows courts to express the different aspects 
of determining the legal meaning of a text. By providing an initial 
anchoring point for deciding whether arguments about meaning are 
accepted or rejected, the ordinary meaning concept is an essential 
aspect of legal interpretation that enhances judicial accountability. A 
sequential process whereby ordinary meaning is first explicitly 
determined and then (1) accepted as the legal meaning of the text, 
(2) rejected in favor of an unordinary meaning, or (3) precisified in 
some way because the ordinary meaning is indeterminate in relation 
to the interpretive question before the court, is preferable to an 
alternative where the legal meaning is decided without considering 
the ordinary meaning of the text. 
Notwithstanding its importance, the presumptive meaning 
created by the ordinary meaning doctrine can be overcome on 
whatever basis a court finds persuasive. Frequently, a court will 
choose an interpretation that is motivated by concerns specific to the 
law, such as the desire to avoid serious constitutional questions.61 In 
other situations, a particular context will indicate that some 
 
 59.  See infra note 82 (criticizing judicial reliance on dictionaries). 
 60.  Certainly, there are also numerous systematicities associated with pragmatics. See 
generally FRANÇOIS RECANATI, TRUTH-CONDITIONAL PRAGMATICS (2010). It is nonetheless 
useful to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics when analyzing language. 
 61.  See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000). 
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unordinary meaning was intended. For example, if an intentionalist 
judge believes that the ordinary meaning of the relevant language 
conflicts with legislative intent, the judge may choose a different 
meaning. In these cases, as well as many cases involving interpre-
tations motivated by legal concerns, the legal meaning given to the 
text will differ from the ordinary meaning of the words used.62 
Judicial decisions regarding ordinary meaning are typically 
explained in the judge’s opinion, thereby illustrating the justificatory 
nature of legal interpretation. In general courts do not simply 
announce or assume that a particular interpretation is correct but 
rather explain their process of reasoning. Specifically, courts explain 
how the evidence establishes a meaning that corresponds with one of 
the objectives of interpretation, such as determining the ordinary 
meaning of the language.63 An ordinary meaning determination, 
therefore, adds explicit structure to what might otherwise be a 
comparatively open-ended judicial explanation if only the final legal 
meaning of the text were being determined. Thus, notwithstanding 
its defeasibility, the presumption of ordinary meaning sets a useful 
default which requires that deviations be explained and justified or 
that the indefinite nature of the language be identified. Of course, 
courts might erroneously evaluate the relevant language, such as by 
exaggerating its definiteness. Judges are, nevertheless, accountable 
for the meanings they choose in the sense that they should give 
reasons for their decisions.64 
Ordinary meaning is, thus, a presumptive meaning that can be 
modified on the basis of concerns specific to the law or a conclusion 
 
 62.  See also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706 n.9 (2000) (explaining that 
the Court was “departing from the rule of construction that prefers ordinary meaning . . . . 
[T]his is exactly what ought to happen when the ordinary meaning fails to fit the text and 
when the realization of clear congressional policy . . . is in tension with the result that 
customary interpretive rules would deliver.”), superseded by statute, 21st Century Department 
of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1806 
(2002); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 70 (stating that “[o]ne should assume the 
contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise. 
Sometimes there is reason to think otherwise, which ordinarily comes from context.”) 
(emphasis removed). A particular context may also make a vague or general meaning more 
precise by indicating that some more determinate meaning was intended by the legislature 
than the textual language that was used. 
 63.  The relevant standard is typically seen by courts as a straightforward search for the 
“correct” interpretation. 
 64.  See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1571 (1988). 
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(based on contextual cues) that the legislature intended to give the 
language a meaning other than its ordinary meaning. Nevertheless, 
the above discussion that distinguishes between ordinary meaning 
and the legal meaning given to the text by the judge is, admittedly, 
somewhat normative, rather than descriptive, in nature. Courts do 
not uniformly or consistently discuss or distinguish these concepts.65 
Though, if it is to be a coherent concept, the notion of ordinary 
meaning must entail that some meanings can be grammatical and 
comprehensible but nevertheless unusual and thus not ordinary.66 In 
that sense, the ordinary meaning doctrine establishes a constraint on 
interpretations that presumptively excludes meanings that are 
unlikely or unusual. 
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACH TO ORDINARY MEANING 
If the linguistic meaning of a legal text is an integral aspect of its 
legal meaning, even if not always decisive, an accurate understanding 
of the conventions and systematicities of language should be 
important to legal interpreters. Unlike the ultimate legal meaning 
given a text, which may well reflect considerations other than 
language, an ordinary meaning should be orthogonal to such 
concerns.67 Determining ordinary meaning though may seem at 
different times, either self-evident or elusive. Courts must answer, 
even if implicitly, both the constituent question of what makes a 
meaning the ordinary one and the evidential question of what are 
the proper determinants of ordinary meaning.68 The constituent 
 
 65.  A recent exception is Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012), 
where the Court determined that “interpreter” can, but does not ordinarily, include one who 
translates written documents, reasoning that just because a dictionary “definition is broad 
enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily 
understood in that sense.” Id. at 568 (emphasis omitted). The Court indicated that an 
unordinary, but sometimes used, meaning of the word, which includes document translation, 
would not control “unless the context in which the word appears indicates that it does.” Id. 
at 569. 
 66.  See infra notes 129–57 and accompanying text (describing Smith v. United States, 
508 U.S. 223 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 
Stat. 3469, where Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the Court’s meaning was grammatical 
and comprehensible, but nonetheless unordinary). 
 67.  See supra notes 3, 41 and accompanying text (explaining that the ordinary meaning 
doctrine is based on the presumption that legal and nonlegal language coincide). 
 68.  See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 94–95 (describing the constituent and 
evidential questions). 
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question requires that one believe that there is such a thing as an 
“ordinary meaning” and that ordinary meaning can be distinguished 
from other concepts, such as technical or unusual meaning. In turn, 
the evidential question might be framed as empirical in nature and 
based on an accurate understanding of language. Perhaps because 
the answers to the constituent and evidential questions may seem 
elusive or daunting, they are typically treated by courts as self-
evident.69 This Part does not seek to comprehensively answer the 
constituent and evidential questions but rather outlines the issues 
involved in answering these questions before briefly addressing how 
corpus linguistics is relevant to the resolution of the issues raised. 
A. The Constituent Question of Ordinary Meaning 
The constituent question may seem self-evident to courts and 
others because language usage is effortless for the average native 
speaker of a language. A typical person encounters thousands of 
words in a single day and uses them with great facility, seemingly 
without thinking.70 In a real sense, even nonlinguists are experts in 
their native languages. For instance, judgments by native speakers of 
the grammaticality and acceptability of sentences, as well as other 
linguistic intuitions, can be a major source of evidence for linguists 
when constructing grammars.71 In contrast, the selection of some 
standard of meaning commonness, or some other linguistic measure 
necessary to constitute ordinary meaning, is a normative matter that 
must be decided based on the needs of the legal profession.72 
However, courts have not offered consistent answers to the 
constituent question of what makes a meaning the ordinary one. At 
times, the Supreme Court has indicated that a permissible but 
unusual usage may not fall within the ordinary meaning of a word.73 
In contrast, in the (in)famous case, Smith v. United States, the Court 
 
 69.  See id. at 2–3. 
 70.  JEAN AITCHISON, WORDS IN THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MENTAL 
LEXICON 3 (4th ed. 2012). 
 71.  CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS: GRAMMATICALITY 
JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY xvii (2016). 
 72.  Of course, linguistics can help determine whether that standard has been met. 
 73.  See supra note 65 (describing Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 
560 (2012)). 
4.GRIESSLOCUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018 4:01 PM 
1417 Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics 
 1435 
suggested that an unusual but still permissible usage would fall 
within the ordinary meaning of the relevant language.74 
Other facts specific to the law also distinguish legal language 
from nonlegal discourse and, in some ways, make legal interpretation 
more difficult and less susceptible to layperson judgment. For 
instance, routine, everyday interpretation often yields a “merely 
‘good enough’” meaning, “rather than a detailed linguistic 
representation of an utterance’s meaning.”75 However, litigated cases 
frequently pose close and contested issues of meaning that implicate 
linguistic knowledge that is rarely deemed pertinent to routine, 
nonlegal verbal interactions. Such advanced knowledge of syntax and 
semantics is not obtained merely by fluent knowledge of a language. 
A judge might, for example, be called to consider the relevance of a 
comma (or its absence) to the meaning of the text.76 This sort of 
interpretive problem does not occur in oral conversations and may 
be infrequently encountered by the ordinary person. Furthermore, 
legal cases often involve lexical fuzziness or underspecification that 
may not be a concern in ordinary conversations but may pose 
problems in legal interpretation. Legal interpretation is binary in 
nature and requires a “yes” or “no” answer to resolve the legal 
dispute at issue. If, for example, the dispute involves a matter of 
categorization (e.g., is a Segway a vehicle?), the court must give a 
definitive answer even if language experts indicate that category 
membership among ordinary language users is properly viewed as a 
matter of degree.77 
The strong norm encouraging the externality of judicial decision-
making, reflected in the ordinary meaning doctrine, also adds 
production costs to the identification of ordinary meaning. If the 
identification of ordinary meaning is not satisfied merely by the 
 
 74.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 230 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of 
Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469; see infra Part IV (describing and 
analyzing the case). 
 75.  See Fernanda Ferreira, The Misinterpretation of Noncanonical Sentences, 47 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 164 (2003). 
 76.  Courts will, for example, consider a principle such as the rule of the last antecedent, 
which provides that when a modifier is set off from a series of antecedents by a comma, the 
modifier should be interpreted to apply to all the antecedents. Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the 
Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 2 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 81, 87 (1996). 
 77.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the no-vehicles-in-the-
park hypothetical). 
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judge’s personal intuitions as a fluent speaker of the language but 
rather depends to some degree on external verification, the 
requirement that articulated reasons support the meaning chosen 
will tend to make the process elusive rather than self-evident. The 
philosopher Waismann, writing about the “ordinary use of language” 
by philosophers, wondered, “[H]ow ought one to determine what 
this ordinary use is, e.g. in a case of doubt?”78 One could “ask 
people,” perhaps targeting the “competent ones,” which may be 
difficult or controversial.79 With legal interpretation, a court might 
ask what a “reasonable person” would deem to be the ordinary 
meaning of the provision, but the reasonable person standard 
provides dubious externality when it is used by a judge with no 
external determinants of meaning.80 
The reasonable person standard may have some value in 
underscoring that an interpretation should be external to the, 
perhaps idiosyncratic, personal views of the judge, instead being 
based on the conventions of the larger community. But the 
reasonable person standard does not itself provide any sort of 
empirical test for the conventions of the relevant language 
community.81 Considering that the “reasonable person” is a fictional 
construct, it is intuitive that judges might seek to test the ordinary 
meaning of textual language through some scenario that is real 
rather than an abstract construct. For instance, Justice Scalia 
wondered in a dissenting opinion whether “the acid test of whether a 
word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could 
use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people 
look at you funny. The Court’s assigned meaning would surely fail 
that test, even late in the evening.”82 Similarly, in a concurring 
 
 78.  F. Waismann, Analytic-Synthetic IV, 11 ANALYSIS 115, 122 (1951). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  It would be circular to aver that a meaning is ordinary simply by virtue of the actual 
interpreter proclaiming it as such. There is therefore a necessary distinction between what is in 
fact the case and what any given individual believes to be the case. 
 81.  See Karen Petroski, The Strange Fate of Holmes’s Normal Speaker of English, in THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 105–29 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017) 
(discussing the failure of courts to develop the reasonable person standard with respect 
to interpretation). 
 82.  Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), 
superseded by statute, 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1806 (2002). Not surprisingly, the Court in its majority 
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opinion that argued for a restricted meaning for “tangible object” in 
the statutory phrase “any record, document, or tangible object,” 
Justice Alito wondered, “who wouldn’t raise an eyebrow if a 
neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to a ‘record’ or 
‘document,’ said ‘crocodile’?”83 Of course, neither a “cocktail party” 
standard nor an “eyebrow” standard can be adopted as a general test 
of ordinary meaning; rather, they serve to highlight the absence of 
competing standards used by judges. 
B. The Evidential Question of Ordinary Meaning 
The constituent question of what makes some meaning the 
ordinary one is intimately intertwined with the evidential question of 
the proper determinants of ordinary meaning and, in light of the 
absence of any clear answer for the constituent question, answering 
the latter question seems to answer the former. Consider one 
prominent determinant of meaning—dictionary definitions—which 
currently are used as a sort of substitute for corpus analysis. Courts 
frequently rely on dictionary definitions to determine meaning.84 
The increased judicial reliance on dictionaries since the 1980s can be 
traced to the influence of textualism and its focus on linguistic 
meaning.85 Judges undoubtedly believe that dictionaries provide an 
expert, neutral, and external standard for the ordinary meaning of 
words. A dictionary definition is not created for the purpose of 
litigation, is external to the judge, and is not widely viewed as being 
created on the basis of ideological biases. Furthermore, the difficult 
work of defining a word in a dictionary has already been performed 
by an expert. The judge merely has to consult a dictionary and select 
the appropriate meaning for the word. Although judicial reliance on 
dictionaries has increased, their usefulness in determining ordinary 
meaning has been challenged. 
 
opinion indicated that it did not “consider usage at a cocktail party a very sound general 
criterion of statutory meaning.” Id. at 706 n.9 (majority opinion). 
 83.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1089 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 84.  See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s 
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 
483 (2013). 
 85.  See id. (explaining that, while the United States Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries 
was virtually nonexistent before 1987, now as many as one-third of statutory decisions cite 
dictionary definitions). 
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Some of the issues regarding dictionaries concern how they are 
(mis)used by judges. Critics have, for example, addressed judges’ 
tendency to go “dictionary shopping,” which allows them to select 
the particular dictionary and definition that furthers the judge’s 
personal predilections.86 A further problem is that courts often 
erroneously treat the definitions as though they set forth necessary 
and sufficient conditions of category membership.87 If ordinary 
meaning is being sought, a strict, quasi-mathematical symbolization 
of meaning is deeply flawed. As argued above, judges are typically 
motivated to define words in such a way as to avoid uncertainty in 
application, which assists the judge in reaching the required “yes or 
no” answer in what seems like an objective manner. The court can 
therefore point to a broad dictionary definition (e.g., something 
defining vehicles as “means of carrying or transporting something · 
planes, trains, and other vehicles”88) and treat the definition as 
though it sets forth necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
concept. Defining words in such a manner may seem to narrow 
interpretive discretion. The result, however, is contrary to the 
empirical findings and theoretical work of linguists and psychologists 
regarding the nature of word meanings.89 
Other issues involving the construction of dictionaries should 
also undercut their use by judges. For example, dictionaries tend to 
favor definitions that represent technical meanings, which may not 
accurately reflect the ordinary meaning of the words.90 A different 
issue concerns the contribution that context makes to meaning. 
While dictionaries are useful as a general matter, “the listing of words 
as a set of isolated items can be highly misleading if used as a basis of 
 
 86.  See Aprill, supra note 11. 
 87.  See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION 62–63 (2010). 
 88.  Vehicle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/veh 
icle (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 89.  See SOLAN, supra note 87, at 63–66. 
 90.  Thus, dictionaries do not always reflect the important distinction between the 
flexible meaning of terms in natural language and the stipulative definitions of the scientist. 
Patrick Hanks explains that “[g]iving a precise, unambiguous definition for a word is a 
stipulative procedure, not a descriptive one, and a stipulative definition inevitably assigns the 
status of technical term to the word so defined, removing it from the creative potential that is 
offered by fuzzy meaning in natural language.” PATRICK HANKS, LEXICAL ANALYSIS: NORMS 
AND EXPLOITATIONS 8 (2013). 
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theorizing about what words and their meanings are.”91 The 
problem is that a dictionary is a highly abstract work that presents 
words individually and takes them “away from their common use in 
their customary settings.”92 
Philosophers of language and linguists typically focus on 
sentences as the relevant units of meaning.93 In contrast, the 
judiciary’s “focus on word meaning instead of sentence meaning 
stems from [its] overreliance on dictionaries, which offer acontextual 
word meanings.”94 Instead of an exclusive focus on word meaning, a 
distinction should be made between the meaning of words and the 
meaning of sentences.95 Defining ordinary meaning in terms of 
sentence meaning helps to mitigate the tension between the inherent 
nature of contextual consideration by an interpreter and the necessity 
of definitional generalizability. Thus, ultimately the relevant ordinary 
meaning inquiry should not focus on words or expressions such as 
use or vehicle, which encompass numerous and varied senses. Instead, 
the focus should be on the ordinary meaning of the sentences in 
which the words appear.96 
Determinants of ordinary meaning such as dictionaries respond 
to the externality issue in legal interpretation where, without 
evidence external to the interpreter, the basic guide to meaning is 
the interpreter’s own world knowledge. Consequently, identifying 
and assessing the reliability of possible determinants is an essential 
aspect of the ordinary meaning determination. As the previous 
 
 91.  HALLIDAY & YALLOP, supra note 55, at 25. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Word Meaning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/word-meaning/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 94.  SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 107. 
 95.  See BERNARD S. JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN LAW: LINGUISTIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
AND SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVES 43 (1995). 
 96.  One alternative to a focus on sentence meaning is to assert that “the basic unit of 
meaning [is] not the sentence, but the relations among sentences.” SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 
107. Obviously, the relations among sentences might reveal that the communicative meaning 
of a text differs from its ordinary meaning. Such an observation does not establish, though, 
that the basic unit of meaning is not the sentence. As explained above, there are advantages to 
a sequential kind of interpretation that starts with something more basic than an entire 
document, or even multiple sentences. Still, while the ordinary meaning focus should be on 
the relevant sentence rather than individual words or the entire document (or statute), this 
focus should not be taken as a precise standard. The point is that acontexual searches for 
individual word meanings lead to inaccurate ordinary meaning determinations, but a focus on 
an entire document (or statute) or body of law would result in a search for communicative 
meaning and not ordinary meaning. 
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discussion of dictionaries illustrates, the current determinants do not 
uncontroversially identify ordinary meaning. To the extent that 
ordinary meaning is an empirical question, courts and others should 
consider the possibility that other determinants might be better 
suited to the task. 
C. Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Knowledge 
Regardless of the status of dictionaries in legal interpretation, 
only very basic linguistic analysis is necessary to convince most 
people that a dog is not a vehicle. However, the situation is different 
when the question involves objects harder to classify (e.g., golf cart, 
Segway, scooter).97 In such cases, the extension (i.e., its referential 
range of application) of vehicle must be determined. But linguistic 
theory indicates that in a borderline case there is no linguistic fact-
of-the-matter to discover.98 Understanding this aspect of word 
meanings may lead a judge to conclude that the semantic meaning of 
the concept ‘vehicle’ does not determine the proper categorization 
of the object being considered (such as a Segway). Instead, the case 
must be decided on other grounds, such as the purpose of 
the provision. 
As the above scenario illustrates, if legal texts are to be 
interpreted in light of the accepted and typical standards of 
communication that apply outside of the law, an accurate knowledge 
of language—which would include an understanding of lexical 
fuzziness—should be indispensable to interpretation. Such 
knowledge may not be decisive to meaning, as legal considerations 
may be influential, but it can nevertheless serve an integral role in a 
court’s analysis. Counterintuitively perhaps, the application of 
accurate linguistic analysis to the interpretive question can 
underscore the importance and necessity of nonlinguistic knowledge. 
Correct linguistic analysis of issues such as lexical fuzziness can reveal 
the indefinite nature of language, which makes resorting to other 
considerations necessary. Such a result can, therefore, help frame the 
scope of judicial discretion accurately and explicitly, adding to the 
justificatory nature of legal interpretation. 
 
 97.  These examples are taken from Justice Scalia’s analysis of the no-vehicles-in-the-
park hypothetical. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 36. 
 98.  See STEWART SHAPIRO, VAGUENESS IN CONTEXT 2 (2006). 
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However, some have advocated that the use of corpus linguistics 
may solve certain long-standing problems of legal interpretation, 
including those involving lexical fuzziness.99 Like dictionaries, corpus 
linguistics can provide externality to interpretations, but, in contrast 
to dictionaries, corpus linguistics is a method for studying language 
in use and can thus account for some aspects of context.100 Unlike 
dictionaries, corpus linguistics allows for the meanings of words to 
be investigated in light of other words in which they co-occur. 
Instead of relying on the, perhaps idiosyncratic, views of the 
interpreter, corpus linguistics can provide an empirically based 
method of examining word meaning. Indeed, many linguists have 
turned to corpus data because they believe there is more to data 
collection than researchers intuiting acceptability judgments about 
what one can say and what one cannot.101 This is especially true given 
the volatility that individual judgments about acceptability have been 
shown to exhibit.102 
The concept underlying corpus linguistics is also consistent with 
the idea that an ordinary meaning is one that, in some sense, is 
general and cuts across contexts. Corpus-linguistic analyses are 
“always based on the evaluation of some kind of frequencies,” and 
frequency is a crucial aspect of what distinguishes an ordinary 
meaning from some meaning that is perhaps grammatical but 
unordinary.103 Corpus linguistics can identify not only the number of 
senses (i.e., meanings) a linguistic expression may have but also 
which meaning is most frequently used.104 It can provide clues as to 
what the most prototypical meaning of an expression might be based 
on various factors such as (i) highest frequency of use in corpus data, 
(ii) most even distribution/dispersion in a corpus (which 
corresponds to a meaning being used in many very different 
registers/genres), (iii) being the meaning that is acquired earliest by 
 
 99.  See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 12, at 3–5. 
 100.  See HANS LINDQUIST, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 
1 (2009) (“The argument is that if you are interested in the workings of a particular language, 
like English, it is a good idea to study English in use. One efficient way of doing this is to use 
corpus methodology . . . .”). 
 101.  Stefan Th. Gries, What is Corpus Linguistics?, 3 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS 
COMPASS 1225, 1228 (2009). 
 102.  See id. 
 103.  See id. at 1226. 
 104.  See id. 
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children as they learn their mother tongue, (iv) centrality of a 
meaning in terms of how it is related to all other meanings a word 
may have, (v) a meaning of an expression can be seen as prototypical 
if it is the meaning with the highest number of features with the 
highest cue validities (which is a statistical way of measuring how 
predictive a feature is for membership in a category: having feathers 
and a beak increases the chances of something being a bird, having 
eyes does not).105 Of course, corpus linguistics requires a (testable) 
conceptual leap from frequencies to the issue being researched by 
the user. Thus, any corpus findings must be analyzed within some 
framework or understanding of ordinary meaning. 
Because ordinary meaning must in some sense be generalizable 
across contexts, not shaped by legal concerns, it is subject in some 
way to empirical verification. Certainly, as indicated above, corpus 
linguistics can take account of context in ways that dictionaries 
cannot. Nevertheless, unlike other determinants of meaning such as 
legislative history, the main function of corpus analysis is to provide 
data about word meanings that cut across contexts. While such 
information can of course be useful, this limitation helps to explain 
why meaning is often fixed in other ways, such as the structure or 
context of the statute at issue. 
III. UNITED STATES V. COSTELLO 
A. Description of the Case 
The first of our case studies involves the statute at issue in United 
States v. Costello.106 In Costello, the defendant was charged with 
violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which provides for criminal 
penalties for anyone who 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, 
conceals, harbors or shields from detection [or attempts to do any 
of these things], such alien in any place, including any building or 
any means of transportation[.] 
 
 105.  The assumption “underlying most corpus-based analyses” is the so-called 
distributional hypothesis, “that formal differences reflect, or correspond to, functional 
differences” (i.e., semantic). Id. at 1228. 
 106.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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The defendant “lived in a small Illinois town” and “had a 
romantic relationship” with a person “she knew to be an illegal 
alien.”107 The man lived with her for about a year but was eventually 
removed to Mexico after having spent several years in prison.108 The 
man returned to the United States without authorization and “the 
defendant picked him up at the Greyhound bus terminal in St. Louis 
and drove him to her home,” located “about five miles from St. 
Louis.”109 The man lived in the defendant’s home, “more or less 
continuously,” for approximately seven months “until his arrest.”110 
After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of the three charged 
offenses of “concealing, harboring, and shielding from detection an 
alien known to be in this country illegally.”111 
Because “there [was] no evidence that the defendant concealed 
her boyfriend or shielded him from detection,” on appeal the 
Seventh Circuit focused on whether the harboring conviction was 
justified.112 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, 
stated that the government, relying on dictionary definitions, argued 
that to harbor “just means to house a person” and “to shelter.”113 
Posner reasoned that to shelter has an “aura of protectiveness,” 
requiring that the defendant “provide a refuge” and not merely let 
her boyfriend live with her.114 Judge Posner further argued that, in 
any case, dictionary definitions should be “used as sources of 
statutory meaning only with great caution”;115 not only must 
statutory purpose be considered,116 but also “[t]here are a wide 
variety of dictionaries,” typically with multiple definitions for each 
word, which makes resorting to dictionaries to determine ordinary 
meaning “particularly troubling.”117 Furthermore, “[d]ictionary 
definitions are acontextual, whereas the meaning of sentences 
depends critically on context, including all sorts of background 
 
 107.  Id. at 1041–42. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 1043. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 1044. 
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understandings.”118 In addition, legislatures often draft provisions 
with lists of words in order to foreclose loopholes but not necessarily 
to create a provision that extends beyond its purpose.119 
Instead of relying solely on the dictionary definitions, Judge 
Posner conducted a Google search on December 13, 2011, “of 
several terms in which the word ‘harboring’ appears.”120 The search 
was based on the “supposition that the number of hits per term is a 
rough index of the frequency of its use.”121 The search revealed 
the  following: 
• “harboring fugitives”: 50,800 hits 
• “harboring enemies”: 4,730 hits 
• “harboring refugees”: 4,820 hits 
• “harboring victims”: 114 hits 
• “harboring flood victims”: 0 hits 
• “harboring victims of disasters”: 0 hits 
• “harboring victims of persecution”: 0 hits 
• “harboring guests”: 184 hits 
• “harboring friends”: 256 hits (but some involve harboring 
Quakers—”Friends,” viewed in colonial New England as 
dangerous heretics) 
• “harboring Quakers”: 3,870 hits 
• “harboring Jews”: 19,100 hits.122 
For Judge Posner, it was “apparent” from the results of the 
Google search that harboring, unlike sheltering, has a connotation of 
“deliberately safeguarding members of a specified group from the 
authorities, whether through concealment, movement to a safe 
location, or physical protection.”123 Considering the requirement of 
“deliberate[] safeguarding,” Judge Posner reasoned that 
the emergency staff at the hospital may not be “harboring” an alien 
when [they] render[] emergency treatment even if [the alien] stays 
in the emergency room overnight, that giving a lift to a gas station 
to an alien with a flat tire may not be harboring, that driving an 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See id. at 1046. 
 120.  Id. at 1044. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
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alien to the local office of the Department of Homeland Security to 
apply for an adjustment of status to that of lawful resident may not 
be harboring, that inviting an alien for a “one night stand” may not 
be attempted harboring, that placing an illegal alien in a school 
may not be harboring . . . and finally that allowing your boyfriend 
to live with you may not be harboring, even if you know he 
shouldn’t be in the United States.124 
Judge Posner classified conceals, harbors, and shields as “loophole-
stopping near synonyms,”125 but indicated that harboring was still 
not redundant. According to Judge Posner, 
“concealing” is concealing; “shielding from detection” usually is 
concealing but could involve bribing law enforcement authorities—
in other words paying someone else to conceal (yet the shade of 
difference is tiny—no surprise in a string of near synonyms); and 
the office left to “harboring” is, then, materially to assist an alien to 
remain illegally in the United States without publicly advertising 
his presence but without needing or bothering to conceal it . . . 
though harboring could involve advertising, for instance if a church 
publicly offered sanctuary for illegal aliens and committed to resist 
any effort by the authorities to enter the church’s premises to 
arrest  them.126 
Following from the above definitions, Judge Posner presented 
the following scenario, which involves the concept of ‘harboring’ but 
not of ‘concealing’ or ‘shielding’: 
Suppose the owner of a Chinese restaurant in New York’s or San 
Francisco’s Chinatown employs known illegal aliens as cooks, 
waiters, and busboys because they are cheap labor, and provides 
them with housing in order to make the employment, poorly paid 
though it is, more attractive, and also because they lack 
documentation that other landlords would require of would-be 
renters. The owner is harboring these illegal aliens in the sense of 
taking strong measures to keep them here. Yet there may be no 
effort at concealment or shielding from detection, simply because 
the immigration authorities, having very limited investigative 
resources, may have no interest in rooting out illegal aliens in 
Chinese restaurants in Chinatowns. It is nonetheless harboring in 
 
 124.  Id. at 1044–45. 
 125.  Id. at 1046. 
 126.  Id. at 1046–47. 
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an appropriate sense because the illegal status of the alien is 
inseparable from the decision to provide housing—it is a decision 
to provide a refuge for an illegal alien because he’s an illegal alien.127 
Unlike the defendant’s actions, the restaurant owner “provides 
an inducement to illegal aliens.”128 Furthermore, the example 
illustrates that harboring is not redundant with concealing 
because the 
owner does not house his illegal employees in order to conceal 
them, though that is one effect. He is reducing their interactions 
with citizens, who might report them to the authorities. It is a 
perfect case of harboring, but might be a weak case of concealing, 
if the defendant could convince the jury that concealment was not 
his purpose in housing them.129 
By the end of his opinion, Judge Posner had offered three 
different glosses on harboring: (1) “deliberately safeguarding 
members of a specified group from the authorities, whether through 
concealment, movement to a safe location, or physical protection”;130 
(2) “materially to assist an alien to remain illegally in the United 
States without publicly advertising his presence but without needing 
or bothering to conceal it” (and, perhaps, offering an “inducement” 
to the alien);131 and (3) providing or offering “a known illegal alien a 
secure haven, a refuge, a place to stay in which the authorities are 
unlikely to be seeking him.”132 At the same time, and to set the stage 
for our subsequent analysis, he also made claims that suggest he 
thinks to harbor and to shelter are similar because (a) he argued “‘to 
shelter’ has an aura of protectiveness”133 and (b) he said to harbor has 
a connotation “of deliberately safeguarding members,”134 which 
seems to include an aura of protectiveness too, even if the objects 
being harbored might be different or more specific than the objects 
being sheltered. 
 
 127.  Id. at 1045. 
 128.  Id. at 1046. 
 129.  Id. at 1049. 
 130.  Id. at 1044. 
 131.  See id. at 1046–47. 
 132.  Id. at 1050. 
 133.  Id. at 1043 (emphasis added). 
 134.  Id. at 1044. 
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B. Corpus Analysis of the Case 
From a corpus-linguistic perspective, Posner’s approach to 
determining the meaning of to harbor (and potentially its similarity 
to to shelter) is highly problematic for two reasons. First, while a 
proper corpus-linguistic analysis of the meaning of a particular verb 
(such as harbor) would indeed entail the exploration of the verb’s 
arguments—e.g., the entity performing the action denoted by the 
verb (usually referred to as the agent) or the entity that undergoes 
some change as a result of the action denoted by the verb (usually 
referred to as the patient)—Judge Posner a priori restricts his ‘data’ 
to a highly selective subset of patients. Judge Posner’s method fails 
to (i) showcase the true variety of the direct objects of to harbor, 
both in terms of the lexical items showing up in the direct object slot 
of to harbor and in terms of the semantic prosody of the objects that 
to harbor takes, and (ii) lead to what is likely to be the ordinary 
meaning of to harbor. 
Second, while a certain degree of subjective intuition is virtually 
unavoidable in the comparative analysis of words, Judge Posner’s 
discussion of the verbs to harbor and to shelter and how they relate to 
the government’s definitions of to harbor, to shelter, and to house is 
more subjective than what a proper linguistic analysis would permit. 
Instead of being based on potentially falsifiable and replicable data, 
the semantic characteristics Judge Posner posits are based on little 
else other than his own intuitions. 
A more appropriate corpus-linguistic analysis would differ in two 
main ways. First, it would not be restricted to a few argument types 
selected by an analyst. Rather, an analyst could generate a 
concordance of the verb(s) in question and then explore all the 
verbs’ argument types to arrive at a better understanding of their 
usage, which is the strategy that we follow here. Second, such an 
analysis would attempt to be intersubjective and replicable by 
exploring all usage tokens (specific instances in which an expression 
is used) of the words (in a pseudo-random sample) with an 
annotation scheme that is grounded in linguistic analysis which could 
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potentially be applied in a validation study.135 Again, that is the 
approach we follow here. 
Specifically, we used a script in the programming language R to 
retrieve all instances of the verb to harbor (including spellings with u) 
and to shelter that were tagged as verbs from the 2012–2015 update 
of the Corpus of Contemporary American English.136 We obtained 
453 instances of the lemma to harbor, which were then inspected 
manually to identify the agent and the patient of the harboring (i.e., 
the entity that does the harboring and the entity that is harbored).137 
Each agent and patient was then classified into one of several 
semantic categories that proved useful in previous corpus-semantic 
work.138 Categories include, but are not limited to, those exemplified 
in (1) (for the sake of brevity, we exemplify only patients and 
abbreviate the concordance lines): 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. an area harboring the highest level of 
biodiversity 
[abstract] 
b. a dark continent harboring mastodons [animate] 
c. most strains harbored genes [genetic] 
d. a star harbored an earth-sized planet [concrete] 
e. what shame and anger would he harbor? [emotion/
cognition/
perception] 
f. a part of the world that harbors islamist 
militants 
[human] 
g. houses often harboring political action 
committees 
[institutions] 
 
 135.  See, for example, Stefan Th. Gries & Naoki Otani, Behavioral Profiles: A Corpus-
Based Perspective on Synonymy and Antonymy, ICAME J., Apr. 2010, at 121, http://clu.uni
.no/icame/ij34/gries_otani.pdf, or in fact nearly every corpus-based semantic study. 
 136.  See Mark Davies, The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 520 
million words, 2012-2015 (2016). Available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/. 
 137.  Not all instances involved both an agent and a patient, as in agentless passives. 
 138.  See, e.g., Stefan Th. Gries, Corpus-based Methods and Cognitive Semantics: The Many 
Meanings of To Run, in CORPORA IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: CORPUS-BASED APPROACHES 
TO SYNTAX AND LEXIS 57 (Stefan Th. Gries & Anatol Stefanowitsch eds., 2006). 
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While the semantic classification of patients is not completely 
uncontroversial, the quantitative findings are relatively clear. For to 
harbor, the data show that humans (i.e., the kinds of objects Judge 
Posner restricted his analysis to) are in fact quite infrequent as 
patients of to harbor, indicating that Judge Posner’s results are 
unrepresentative and, thus, not conducive to discovering ordinary 
meaning. More precisely, we found the following relative frequencies 
of occurrence of classifiable patients: emotion/cognition/perception 
(44.3%) > animate (16.3%) > concrete (13.7%) > human (10.8%) > 
abstract (5.9%) > genetic x (5.2%) > institution = disease = location. 
This is relevant because, in order to make specific claims about the 
general semantics of to harbor, one must acknowledge that most uses 
of to harbor are in fact neither concerned with harboring humans in 
general nor with humans considered “worthy of protection/safe-
guarding” in particular. Rather, most of the uses involve emotions 
and biological/genetic entities, which also undercuts the postulated 
connotation of protectiveness Judge Posner derived from his too 
limited set of direct objects. Obviously, if one looks for a verb 
followed by entities that can and maybe should be protected, a 
connotation of protectiveness will emerge. In a sense, this is like 
arguing that to run ordinarily means ‘manage’ because one can find 
many examples such as to run a chain of stores or to run a business on 
Google and one never looked for to run a race or to run a [distance 
noun]. Therefore, on the one hand, most cases of to harbor are 
obviously not compatible with Judge Posner’s definition. On the 
other hand, such uses of to harbor are in fact very compatible with 
the government’s more inclusive definition of to harbor, namely 
“house a person/giving a person a place to stay” or, even better 
since it is more abstract and thus more clearly covers even non-
human patients, “providing space/a habitat for something.” 
The dominance of this sense in our data in turn means that this 
more general sense might well be the main or ordinary sense, or 
prototype. This should mean that the burden of proof was on Posner 
to show that the narrower and more specific sense of to harbor he 
stipulated was in fact required to define “harbor [such] alien[s].” He 
could theoretically have achieved this in two ways. First, he could 
have provided data to show that our frequency-based approach to 
ordinary meaning is not borne out by other, more, and/or better 
data. Judge Posner, however, discussed to harbor’s semantics only on 
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the basis of the few selected direct objects.139 Second, he could have 
produced data showing that to harbor, when used with the human 
direct objects he uses as search terms, requires a new sense, one that 
is different from the general ‘providing space/a habitat for,’ because 
this general one is not good enough to cover to harbor’s use in the 
statute. However, Judge Posner’s approach fails at that because his 
data are too limited and his argumentation is too reliant on intuition. 
He shows neither that to harbor actually means what he claims nor 
what the relation between to harbor and to shelter is because he never 
makes an explicit comparison between the two, which could in 
theory support the conclusion that the two are extremely similar 
in meaning. 
In particular, and with respect to the use of harbor with human 
direct objects, the data we analyzed also undermine Posner’s ‘corpus’ 
method with regard to the semantic prosody of the objects. As 
mentioned above, the expressions he chose to google are mostly only 
cases that already presupposed his definition: he defines to harbor as 
discussed above and then searches for to harbor + direct objects such 
as fugitives, refugees, and Jews, which are direct objects of the type 
that he stipulates in his definition (i.e., groups of humans that are 
justifiably harbored) and which portray the agent of harboring as 
positive. However, this means that his ‘analysis’ also misses the fact 
that there are uses of to harbor that differ in their potential evaluative 
prosody; the use of harbor enemies is one in which harboring that 
kind of group of humans is probably not justified and portrays the 
harborer as negative. In our data, for instance, we found eighteen 
cases that are arguably ‘not to be protected, not worthy of 
protection, or harboring.’ These cases include terrorists, bandits, 
rebels, militants, pedophile priest, and more. In contrast, we found 
only nine patients of the type Posner restricted his analysis to, namely 
ones that are ‘to be protected, worthy of protection, or harboring,’ 
which include Jews, some dedicated people, many of the priests, and a 
minor. Only four of our 453 instances involved harboring fugitives. 
More importantly, the examples of to harbor we have with our wider 
search did not all involve “safeguarding from the authorities,” 
suggesting that his definition is too specific and that the more 
 
 139.  See supra text accompanying note 125. 
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general definition of to harbor implied by all the nonhuman 
harborees may be sufficient. 
Let us finally return to the question of the potential difference 
between to harbor and to shelter, which, according to Posner, the 
government considered synonymous, and to both of which Posner 
attributed a meaning component of protectiveness or safe-guarding. 
To illustrate the kind of comparison one could employ, the same 
kind of procedure we applied to to harbor was then applied to the 
325 matches of the verb lemma to shelter. The distribution of its 
patients is quite different from that of to harbor: human (60.6%) > 
concrete (15.5%) > animate (10.4%) > abstract (5.2%) > location = 
emotion/cognition/perception. When submitted to a simple 
statistical test (viz. a chi-squared test for independence), we find a 
statistically significant difference between the kinds of things that are 
harbored and sheltered. The biggest effects are: (i) to harbor prefers 
emotion/cognition/perception (in all registers) >> genetic x (mostly 
in academic writing) > animate; and (ii) to shelter prefers human (in 
all registers) >> [not expressed] = location = concrete. The data thus 
shows that the two verbs are indeed quite different in usage and, by 
implication, in meaning. This does not support the government’s 
view that to harbor and to shelter are synonymous, but it suggests—
maybe somewhat ironically—that to shelter is used in a way that 
Judge Posner implied to harbor would be used in, namely, mostly 
with direct objects that are human, concrete objects, and animals. 
The current study of to harbor and to shelter could be made 
corpus-linguistically more sophisticated. For instance, part of Judge 
Posner’s argument is concerned with whether the additions of 
harboring and concealing to the statute in the 1952 amendments do 
in fact make the statute more precise or comprehensive, or both. 
This kind of question essentially boils down to a quantification of a 
semantic similarity question, which in corpus linguistics can be 
operationalized in terms of the overlap of (significant) collocates. In 
what follows, we briefly describe the underlying logic of this 
approach and what it might look like in the present case. 
As briefly mentioned above, most corpus-linguistic work assumes 
that distributional similarity in corpora (i.e., naturally occurring 
speech and writing) reflects functional similarity, where functional is 
typically a broad term for semantic, discoursal, register, and 
information-structural similarity. That means that the similarity of 
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words x and y can be quantified based on how similar the words are 
to each other that occur either in context windows, in syntactically 
defined slots, or in textually defined positions around x and y. For 
instance, to determine whether there is any functional difference 
between the words alphabetic and alphabetical (a question native 
speakers of English are routinely unable to answer), one could 
proceed as follows: 
• determine the nouns that follow alphabetic at least once; 
• determine the nouns that follow alphabetical at least once; 
• for each noun type attested, determine its frequencies after 
alphabetic and alphabetical as well as its overall frequency in 
the corpus. This will also determine how many collocates in 
percent alphabetic and alphabetical share, and the higher that 
proportion and the higher the semantic similarity of the 
collocates (as compared to, say, randomly chosen adjectives 
as a baseline control condition), the higher the two 
adjectives’ similarity; 
• for each noun type attested after at least one of the two 
adjectives, create the following co-occurrence table 
of  frequencies: 
 Alphabetic Alphabetical Total 
some noun type A B a+b 
all other noun 
types 
C D c+d 
Total a+c b+d a+b+c+d 
• Compute an association score from this table, such as the 
log-likelihood ratio or Delta P to quantify which of the two 
adjectives is associated how strongly to each noun collocate 
(compared to the other of the two adjectives). 
A statistical analysis of (i) collocate-overlap statistics and (ii) 
association scores of so-called distinctive collocates can then help to 
identify the overall similarity of words as well as the nature of their 
functional differences. In the case of alphabetic(al), for instance, the 
semantic difference can best be characterized by the two adjectives’ 
antonyms. According to the corpus data, the opposite of alphabetic is 
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numeric, whereas the opposite of alphabetical is unordered.140 In our 
case, it would be straightforward to apply a similar logic to to harbor 
and to shelter (as well as the other verbs relevant to the statute, such 
as to conceal and to shield) to determine to what degree, if any, Judge 
Posner’s account of the similarity between to harbor and to shelter 
is valid. 
Perhaps Judge Posner should be commended for his recognition 
of the flaws associated with judicial reliance on dictionaries and his 
attempt to substitute an empirically based method of language study 
instead of citing to, for example, his own experience and knowledge 
of language or to common sense. Nevertheless, the corpus analysis 
detailed above demonstrates that Judge Posner’s Google searches 
were insufficient to study what to harbor means because the search 
terms he used were not representative of the ordinary uses of to 
harbor (at least as operationalized by frequency). Our analysis thus 
indicates that the determination of ordinary meaning is susceptible 
to error when it is based on judges’ intuitions about how words are 
ordinarily used. Our corpus analysis should not, however, be 
interpreted as an argument that the result in Costello was incorrect. 
Inferences from the context relevant to a statute are crucial to 
interpretation, and are often intertwined with legal concerns.141 It 
might be that contextual inferences pointed to an interpretation of 
the statute that would not allow for conviction based on Costello’s 
actions. Nevertheless, if courts make general claims about language 
meaning as part of an ordinary meaning determination, as Judge 
Posner did in Costello, the sequential nature of interpretation 
(whereby initial indications of meaning are shaped by contextual 
concerns) becomes flawed if those semantic judgments 
are inaccurate.142 
 
 140.  See Stefan Th. Gries, Testing the Sub-Test: An Analysis of English -ic and -ical 
Adjectives, 8 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 31, 41–42 (2003). 
 141.  See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of 
context to legal interpretation). 
 142.  See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (describing the sequential nature 
of interpretation). 
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IV. SMITH V. UNITED STATES 
A. Description of the Case 
The infamous case, Smith v. United States,143 involved the 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which (remarkably for a 
routine criminal statute providing a penalty enhancement and 
presenting no constitutional issues) has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court on multiple occasions.144 Section 924(c)(1)(A) 
provides for enhanced punishment if the defendant “uses” a firearm 
“during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.”145 In 
Smith, the defendant offered to trade an automatic weapon to an 
undercover officer for cocaine.146 The Court held that the defendant 
was subject to the sentencing enhancement because the statute does 
not require that the firearm have been used as a weapon.147 
The Court explained that “when a word is not defined by 
statute,” as most are not, courts “normally construe it in accord with 
its ordinary or natural meaning.”148 The Court stated that 
exchanging a firearm for drugs “can be described as ‘use’ within the 
everyday meaning of that term.”149 The Court consulted two 
dictionaries regarding the word use and concluded that it means “to 
employ” or “to derive service from.”150 The Court rejected the 
argument that uses has a reduced scope in § 924(c)(1)(A) because it 
appears alongside the word firearm.151 The Court reasoned that “[i]t 
is one thing to say that the ordinary meaning of ‘uses a firearm’ 
 
 143.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469. 
 144.  See Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007); Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125 (1998), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 
3469; Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in United States v. O’Brien, 560 
U.S. 218 (2010). 
 145.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The statute also applies to anyone who “carries” 
or, since an amendment to the statute in 1998, “possesses” a firearm “during and in relation 
to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.” Id. In the cases described in this section, the defendants 
were all charged with “use” of the firearm. 
 146.  Smith, 508 U.S. at 225–26. 
 147.  See id. at 240. 
 148.  Id. at 228. Because the defendant traded a “machinegun,” the sentence was thirty 
years. Id. at 227. 
 149.  Id. at 228. 
 150.  Id. at 229. 
 151.  Id. at 229–33. 
4.GRIESSLOCUM_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018 4:01 PM 
1417 Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics 
 1455 
includes using a firearm as a weapon . . . [b]ut it is quite another to 
conclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any other use.”152 
Thus, because “one can use a firearm in a number of ways. That one 
example of ‘use’ is the first to come to mind . . . does not preclude 
us from recognizing that there are other ‘uses’ that qualify as 
well.”153 Due to the broad meaning of use, the Court concluded that 
the statute’s language “sweeps broadly, punishing any ‘us[e]’ of a 
firearm, so long as the use is ‘during and in relation to’ a drug 
trafficking offense.”154 Therefore, the Court reasoned, “[I]t is both 
reasonable and normal to say that [the defendant] ‘used’ his MAC-
10 in his drug trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine.”155 In the 
Court’s view, if Congress had intended that the firearm be used as a 
weapon in order for the enhanced punishment to apply, it could have 
included the words “as a weapon” in the statute.156 
In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s failure to properly 
consider context in determining the ordinary meaning of use. First, 
Justice Scalia pointed out the “elastic” nature of the word use.157 
Second, he argued that “[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means 
to use it for its intended purpose.”158 Thus, “to speak of ‘using a 
firearm’ is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a 
weapon.”159 Justice Scalia reasoned that “[w]hen someone asks, ‘Do 
you use a cane?,’ he is not inquiring whether you have your 
grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he 
wants to know whether you walk with a cane.”160 In Justice Scalia’s 
view, the words “as a weapon” were “reasonably implicit” from the 
context of the statute.161 
In a similar case, in 2007 the Court held in Watson v. United 
States,162 that a person who trades drugs for a gun does not “‘use[]’ a 
firearm ‘during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.’”163 
 
 152.  Id. at 230 (emphasis omitted). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 229. 
 155.  Id. at 230. 
 156.  Id. at 229. 
 157.  Id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158.  Id. at 242. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 244. 
 162.  Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007). 
 163.  Id. at 76. 
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In Smith the Court emphasized the dictionary meaning of “any” and 
discounted Justice Scalia’s examples that were designed to 
distinguish between the ordinary meaning of a phrase and the 
Court’s reliance on the dictionary definition of a single word. In 
contrast, the Court emphasized in Watson that “the meaning of the 
verb ‘uses’ has to turn on the language as we normally speak it.”164 
In the Court’s view, the proper interpretation must “appeal to the 
ordinary” because “there is no other source of a reasonable inference 
about what Congress understood when writing or what its words 
will bring to the mind of a careful reader.”165 Based on its own 
understanding of common usage, the Court reasoned as follows: 
The Government may say that a person ‘uses’ a firearm simply by 
receiving it in a barter transaction, but no one else would. A boy 
who trades an apple to get a granola bar is sensibly said to use the 
apple, but one would never guess which way this commerce 
actually flowed from hearing that the boy used the granola.166 
While the Court in Smith indicated that a broad meaning should 
be given the provision considering its purpose of combating the 
dangerous combination of drugs and guns,167 the Court in Watson 
declined to give such considerations significance without providing 
any real discussion.168 Furthermore, the Court in Watson failed to 
recognize that unlike the verbs sell or give, use is not unidirectional. 
As the Court noted in its earlier decision in Bailey v. United States, 
one of the dictionary definitions of use is “[t]o convert to one’s 
service,” and another was “to avail oneself of.”169 Certainly, if one 
wanted to rely on a dictionary definition, the receipt of a firearm as 
one’s possession means that the item has been “convert[ed] to 
one’s service.”170 
 
 164.  Id. at 79. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240–41 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of 
Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469. 
 168.  Watson, 552 U.S. 74. 
 169.  Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 
228–29), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 State. 3469, 
as recognized in United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010). 
 170.  Id. Of course, such a conclusion should not be based on a dictionary definition, but 
we make this point only to highlight the inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions. 
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Note that the Court in Smith, when presented with Justice 
Scalia’s dissent pointing out that the common understanding of use a 
firearm is ‘discharging a firearm,’ does not argue that Justice Scalia is 
incorrect about the ordinary or common meaning of use (v.). 
Instead, the Court retreats to a position that might polemically be 
paraphrased as follows: ‘Just because a more specific meaning may be 
compatible with the dictionary definition we cite earlier, and may in 
fact be the most common use (we [the Court] seem to concede this 
since we do not provide any counterevidence to that claim), does not 
mean that we cannot choose the more abstract dictionary meaning 
we prefer and for whose ordinariness or commonness we simply do 
not provide any evidence.’ Somewhat ironically, the Court then 
rejects Justice Scalia’s argument of how one might use a cane by 
stating: “To be sure, ‘use’ as an adornment in a hallway is not the 
first ‘use’ of a cane that comes to mind. But certainly, it does not 
follow that the only ‘use’ to which a cane might be put is assisting 
one’s grandfather in walking.”171 
That is to say, the same Court that a few paragraphs earlier 
argued that “words not defined in statute should be given ordinary 
or common meaning” then rejects Justice Scalia’s argument, which is 
essentially based on operationalizing ordinariness or commonness as 
‘what comes to mind first.’ One is tempted to ask pointedly, what 
definition of ordinariness the Court is assuming when it rejects 
Justice Scalia’s operationalization of ordinariness and instead 
provides an arcane example of caning in the U.S. Senate in 1856?172 
B. Corpus Analysis of the Case 
There are various legitimate and persuasive bases on which to 
criticize the Court’s opinion in Smith, including the methodological 
inconsistencies between the opinions in Smith and Watson discussed 
above. For instance, although the Court viewed the interpretive 
dispute as requiring a definition of the ordinary meaning of use, a 
dictionary definition cannot answer the question of how the 
defendant must use the firearm within the meaning of the provision. 
Instead, the interpretive difficulties can more precisely be framed as 
arising from the provision’s underspecification of use. The 
 
 171.  Smith, 508 U.S. at 230. 
 172.  See id. at 230–31. 
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underspecification is due to ellipsis, which is a “truncated or partial 
linguistic form” “in which constituents normally occurring in a 
sentence are superficially absent, licensed by structurally present 
prior antecedents.”173 For example, a case of verb phrase ellipsis 
occurs in the sentence: Max went to the store, and Oscar did, too.174 
Cognitive scientists have demonstrated via corpus analysis that 
expressions with fully specified event structures are rare (i.e., are 
elided) “when the event is commonly associated with the noun.”175 
In normal usage, a fully specified event structure is used less than five 
percent of the time.176 Furthermore, “[f]ull event structures tend to 
occur only with less predictable activities.”177 Thus, one critique of 
Smith could focus on the Court’s mistaken focus on use without 
understanding ellipsis and how full event structures are typically 
made explicit only when referencing less predictable activities (such 
as using a firearm as currency).178 
Even apart from the ellipsis issue, a corpus-linguistic analysis of 
use paints a picture that is very much at odds with the very general 
meaning adopted by the Court in Smith on the basis of dictionary 
definitions. Specifically, the Court adopted definitions of use from 
Webster’s Dictionary as well as Black’s Law Dictionary, which raises 
two kinds of problems.179 First, some of the definitions—those in 
Black’s Law Dictionary in particular—are somewhat circular, as when 
use is defined as “[t]o make use of” or “to utilize,” given how these 
supposed definitions of use in fact rely on derivatives of use (v.), 
namely use (n.) and utilize. Second, and more importantly, the 
definitions adopted are too general. For instance, consider how the 
proposed paraphrase of use, “to employ,” can be used in contexts 
(e.g., “he employs many women in his restaurant”) in which use 
 
 173.  Robert May, Ellipsis, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 1094 (2003). 
 174.  See id. The sentence without ellipsis would read: Max went to the store, and Oscar 
went to the store, too. 
 175.  Matthew J. Traxler, Brian McElree, Rihana S. Williams & Martin J. Pickering, 
Context Effects in Coercion: Evidence from Eye Movements, 53 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 1, 2 
(2005) [hereinafter Traxler et al.]. “An event is a type of situation . . . in which something 
happens.” MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 9, at 65. 
 176.  See Traxler et al., supra note 175. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  See Brian G. Slocum, Linguistics and ‘Ordinary Meaning’ Determinations, 33 
STATUTE L. REV. 39, 64 (2012). 
 179.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1993), superseded by statute, Act of 
Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469. 
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would either change the meaning or would have to be given an 
unordinary meaning. 
To provide more objective evidence for Justice Scalia’s 
contention regarding the meaning of use (v.) in general and use a 
firearm in particular, we again turned to the 2012–2015 update of 
the Corpus of Contemporary American English.180 Using another R 
script, we found 21,164 instances where the lemma use is used as a 
verb (search tags for the regex: “^v”) and followed by a determiner 
or possessive pronoun (search tags for the regex: 
“^(dd[12]|at1?|appge)$”) and optionally followed by an adjective 
(search tags for the regex: “jj[rt]?”) and followed by a noun (search 
tags for the regex: “nn[12]”). 
This data set was explored on two different levels. First, we 
looked for all instances where the subsequent context contained a 
small set of weapon nouns. As a result of this set of searches, we 
found 161 instances in which the direct object of use was a noun 
phrase whose head noun lemma was either gun (or derivatives like 
handgun or shotgun; 64 cases), rifle (16 cases), firearm (10 cases), 
pistol (7 cases), or weapon (62 cases). Some of these cases of weapon 
include scenarios that do not refer to firearms (some additional 
examples of weapon nouns were included because those rows 
featured one or more of the above search words later in the 
subsequent context). Sixteen instances were found in which the 
direct object of use was a non-weapon noun (e.g., a van, a stolen car, 
his foot) deployed “as a weapon.” 
Two instances had to be discarded because closer scrutiny 
revealed that their use of weapon nouns was metaphorical in nature 
or did not involve a gun as a weapon (e.g., a caulking gun), leaving 
us with 159 instances. We then checked that the cases we studied 
were sufficiently dispersed.181 Specifically, we checked how many 
 
 180.  See Davies, supra note 136. 
 181.  As is well-known among corpus linguists, using only frequency as a measure of the 
commonness of a word, an expression, or a meaning is treacherous since words with very 
similar or even identical frequencies in a corpus can be very unevenly dispersed. For instance, 
in the Brown corpus, a one million-word corpus of general written American English of the 
1960s, the words “‘staining”‘ and “‘enormous”‘ are equally frequent (37 times), but the 
former occurs in only one of the 500 samples the corpus consists of, whereas the latter occurs 
in 36 of the 500 samples, which means it is much more likely to be used/seen by the 
population the Brown corpus represents. Similar examples abound in other corpora and 
dispersion has been shown to be a better predictor of word recognition times than frequency, 
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instances of our use DET (ADJ/N) WEAPON-N examples were 
attested in each of the twenty parts of the corpus. This was done to 
ensure that whatever results we might have found were not due to a 
high degree of concentration of cases in one corpus part, register, or 
genre, given how that would undermine any claims of 
representativity and ordinary usage. We computed a measure of 
dispersion called DP, which ranges from zero (an element is perfectly 
evenly distributed) to one (an element is completely unevenly 
distributed) and obtained a value of 0.31.182 This value is on the 
‘even’ side of the continuum but can be understood better when one 
considers the words that score comparable values in general corpora. 
Specifically, the value is comparable to that scored by words such as 
shark, doorsteps, cycling, Athens, and funniest in the British National 
Corpus (a 100-million words corpus of British English from the 
1990s). These are all ‘standard words’ that any normal native speaker 
of English and most learners of English would be quite familiar with, 
which supports the notion that the instances of use DET (ADJ/N) 
WEAPON-N are widely used and, thus, representative. 
We then checked the 159 instances for whether the phrase use 
DET (ADJ/N) WEAPON-N referred to an instance in which the 
referent of the weapon-noun was used for barter. There was not a 
single occurrence of such a case. More specifically, approximately 
88% of all cases were clear cases of ‘not barter.’ Most involved 
discharging a weapon or brandishing it for deterrence, while the 
remaining approximately 12% involved cases that were coded as 
‘probably not barter’ in the most conservative way. These include 
cases in which any reader or comprehender would have to bend over 
backwards semantically to impose a potential, but really rather 
unlikely, ‘barter’ reading such as the following instances from 
our data: 
 
see, for example, James S. Adelman, Gordon D.A. Brown & José F. Quesada, Contextual 
Diversity, Not Word Frequency, Determines Word-Naming and Lexical Decision Times, 17 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 814 (2006); Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted Frequencies in Corpora, 
13 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 403 (2008); Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted 
Frequencies in Corpora: Further Explorations, in CORPUS-LINGUISTIC APPLICATIONS: 
CURRENT STUDIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 197 (Stefan Th. Gries, Stefanie Wulff & Mark Davies 
eds., 2010), which is why it is also used in frequency dictionaries such as MARK DAVIES & DEE 
GARDNER, A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH: WORD 
SKETCHES, COLLOCATES, AND THEMATIC LISTS (2010). 
 182.  See Gries, supra note 181. 
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(1) there is no talk of whoever is found guilty of having 
used  these weapons should go to the International 
Criminal Court. 
(2) negotiated the social context of inner-city violence while they 
were on the “outside.” We asked questions regarding 
“disrespect” as well as the following questions: Did they 
carry firearms? In what situations would they use a firearm? 
(3) That’s why I keep receipts, and have myself audited every 
year. If they want me off the job they’d better use a gun. 
Don’t tell Vicky I said that. 
Surely, in example (2) the intended meaning is not to ask in 
which contexts inner-city gang members would use their guns 
for barter. 
Although undoubtedly complicated to nonexperts, the above 
analysis is insufficient. Recent developments in theoretical linguistics, 
in particular cognitive or usage-based Linguistics and Construction 
Grammar, have shown that the meaning of linguistic expressions 
derives not solely from the meanings of lexical items and how they 
are structurally combined in sentences but also from grammatical 
patterns, which have meanings on their own.183 For instance, the 
sentence John fignorpled Mary the book would be understood by most 
speakers as involving transfer of the book from John to Mary, even 
though this understanding cannot possibly arise from the verb simply 
because the verb does not exist, so a speaker of English could not 
have learned its meaning. Rather, it arises from the grammatical 
pattern Vfignorpled NPMary NPthe book. It is therefore necessary to determine 
whether the ‘barter’ reading stipulated by the Supreme Court may 
reside not in use DET (ADJ/N) WEAPON-N, but in a 
constructional pattern more abstract than that. Thus, we also 
explored additional levels of granularity/resolution. We re-ordered 
all 21,000 matches of use from above into a random order and 
annotated the direct objects of use until we reached 159 objects that 
could be classified as concrete objects (this is because guns/firearms 
are concrete objects and because we found 159 uses of weapon 
nouns as discussed above). We then determined for each item in this 
 
 183.  See ADELE E. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCTIONS: A CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR 
APPROACH TO ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (1995); ADELE E. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCTIONS AT 
WORK: THE NATURE OF GENERALIZATION IN LANGUAGE (2006). 
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(admittedly small but completely randomly selected) sample of 
matches of use whether the use + DO pattern was meant to convey 
‘use for barter.’ Again, not a single occurrence of use + DO conveyed 
that meaning. 
In sum, corpus-linguistic analysis revealed that the Court’s 
interpretation of use + DO is incompatible with the ordinary-
meaning approach the Court claims it is applying. Certainly, our 
analysis does not dispute the possibility that use + Concrete Object 
can mean ‘use the concrete object as barter/currency.’ Undoubtedly, 
examples of such usage can be created that are both grammatical and 
comprehensible. The point is that such examples are not ordinary, as 
the above corpus-linguistic analysis reveals. Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Smith is strongly supported on three different levels of 
linguistic/constructional abstraction and on the basis of widely 
dispersed data. In our data randomly sampled from COCA, 
(1) instances of use followed by a direct object involve many 
cases that are not concrete objects or other entities that 
would not straightforwardly evoke an interpretation of use as 
‘use for barter;’ 
(2) instances of use followed by a direct object referring to a 
concrete object never evoked an interpretation of use as ‘use 
for barter;’ 
(3) instances of use followed by a weapon noun never evoke an 
interpretation of use as ‘use for barter.’ 
As in our examination of Costello, we do not claim that our 
corpus analysis here proves that the decision in Smith was incorrect. 
Rather, the point is that the Court’s general claims about language 
meaning, which the Court indicated dictated its decision, were 
flawed and, in fact, supported the defendant’s interpretation. If the 
Court had a more accurate understanding of the ordinary meaning 
of the relevant language but nonetheless still wished to reach the 
same interpretation, it would be compelled to offer quite strong 
inferences from the statutory context in order to justify its 
interpretation (thereby demonstrating the sequential nature of 
interpretation).184 If the Court could not justify an interpretation 
 
 184.  See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (describing the sequential nature 
of interpretation). 
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based on such contextual inferences, it would be obliged to interpret 
the statute in favor of the defendant. 
V. THE NO-VEHICLES-IN-THE-PARK HYPOTHETICAL 
A. Description of the Hypothetical 
Our third vehicle for illustrating corpus analysis of statutes 
involves an enduring and famous legal hypothetical, H. L. A. Hart’s 
no-vehicles-in-the-park scenario.185 The hypothetical asks the 
following questions: “A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into 
the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about 
bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are 
these, as we say, to be called ‘vehicles’ for the purpose of the rule 
or not?”186 
The hypothetical classically frames the challenges inherent in 
categorizing objects and defining words (such as vehicle) and the 
consequent fuzziness often labeled as vagueness) associated with 
such attempts. Categorization is a psychological process whereby 
people, including judges, make judgments about whether an object 
falls within a given concept. The ability to categorize is an integral 
aspect of childhood development. Early in their development 
humans demonstrate the ability to countenance differences in order 
to generalize and form categories based on similarities.187 The ability 
to categorize is beneficial because it allows for the organization of 
knowledge through the creation of taxonomies that include smaller 
classes within larger ones (e.g., one specific horse < a breed of horses 
such as Cleveland Bay < Horses < Animals). As such, categorization 
is part of the process of inductive generalization, where, for example, 
knowing that a creature has features similar to recognized members 
of the category ‘horse’ enables one to categorize the creature as 
a horse. 
In discussing his no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical, Hart 
recognized that “[t]here must be a core of settled meaning” 
associated with general words like vehicle, “but there will be, as well, 
 
 185.  The hypothetical was discussed earlier in this Article. See supra notes 43–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 186.  Hart, supra note 44, at 607. 
 187.  Vladimir M. Sloutsky, The Role of Similarity in the Development of Categorization, 7 
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 246, 246 (2003). 
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a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously 
applicable nor obviously ruled out.”188 The fuzziness associated with 
most natural language concepts, such as ‘vehicle,’ does not 
undermine most day-to-day verbal interactions, in which a high 
degree of precision is not necessary to successful communication. 
The requirements of the legal system, however, are different. 
Interpretive questions (e.g., does a certain object fall within the 
scope of the concept ‘vehicle’) need definite “yes” or “no” answers, 
and frequently the dispute will involve some object at the margins of 
the relevant concept (e.g., a car without an engine).189 Despite the 
human language faculty and its natural ability to categorize, as well 
as the widespread intuition that language users are naturally experts 
on the interpretation of their native language, issues of language and 
meaning—particularly categorization—have long challenged judges 
and commentators.190 
Although Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical is famous 
for its illustration of the difficulties of categorization, he does not 
provide any real explanation of how an interpreter identifies the 
“core of settled meaning” or the parameters of the category.191 That 
is, he does not explain how a judge should identify criteria for 
determining membership in a category such as that denoted by 
vehicle. Such identification is crucial, however, to the ordinary 
meaning doctrine. As discussed earlier, a judge might well approach 
the meaning of the no-vehicles-in-the park provision by consulting a 
dictionary definition of vehicle, the key term in the provision.192 In 
part due to Justice Scalia’s influence on the Court, judicial reliance 
on dictionaries is extensive and has dramatically increased since 
the 1980s.193 
In fact, in his 2012 book, Justice Scalia (as well as his co-author 
Bryan Garner) analyzes the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical and 
argues that judges should consult dictionary definitions in 
 
 188.  Hart, supra note 44, at 607. 
 189.  See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (discussing the bivalency of the 
legal system). 
 190.  See SLOCUM, supra note 27, at 213–76. 
 191.  See Hart, supra note 44. 
 192.  See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (describing the judiciary’s reliance 
on dictionaries). 
 193.  See supra note 86. 
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determining the meaning of vehicle.194 However, Justice Scalia rejects 
the dictionary definitions as being too broad and inclusive, and 
creates instead (without citing any linguistic authority or analysis) his 
own definition, claiming that it would be sufficiently definite so as to 
resolve questions regarding the extension of vehicle.195 He rejects a 
broad dictionary definition that describes a vehicle as “a means of 
carrying or transporting something,”196 along with another defining 
the term as follows: “A means of conveyance, usu. with wheels, for 
transporting people, goods, etc.; a car, cart, truck, carriage, sledge, 
etc.” or “[a]ny means of carriage of transport; a receptacle in which 
something is placed in order to be moved.”197 Scalia concedes that 
“[a]nything that is ever called a vehicle (in the relevant sense) would 
fall within these definitions.”198 Instead, Justice Scalia creates his own 
definition: “The proper colloquial meaning in our view (not all of 
them are to be found in dictionaries) is simply a sizable wheeled 
conveyance (as opposed to one of any size that is motorized).”199 
Armed with his self-created definition, Scalia concludes that 
“remote-controlled model cars, baby carriages, [and] tricycles” 
would not fall under it.200 But how does one decide whether an 
object is “sizable” enough to qualify as a vehicle? If the definition of 
vehicle sets forth necessary and sufficient conditions that include 
anything that is (1) sizable, (2) wheeled, and (3) a conveyance, then 
there must be some size threshold for the category. However, Justice 
Scalia does not offer any standard for evaluating what is “sizable.” 
Notwithstanding his goal of demonstrating an interpretive 
methodology that will produce consistent answers across judges, 
Justice Scalia indicates uncertainty concerning the application of his 
definition to bicycles, indicating that they are “perhaps” not vehicles 
(albeit confirming later that they are not vehicles), and Segways, 
indicating that they are “perhaps” vehicles.201 Why the distinction 
 
 194.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 36–37. 
 195.  See id. at 37. 
 196.  Id. (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1386 (11th 
ed. 2003)). 
 197.  Id. (quoting THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3554 (4th 
ed. 1993)). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 37–38. 
 201.  Id. at 38. 
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between the two (similarly sized) objects? Justice Scalia does not 
offer an explanation, nor does he explain the basis for his 
uncertainty. Furthermore, apparently a scooter is not a vehicle (and 
neither is a motorized wheelchair) but a moped is.202 
The long-standing no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical illustrates 
the inherent fuzziness of language. A major problem, as Justice 
Scalia’s analysis illustrates, is that, it is in tension with the common 
motivation of judges to define words in such a way as to avoid 
uncertainty in application. Doing so assists the judge in reaching the 
required “yes” or “no” answer in what seems like an objective 
manner.203 This may involve selecting a dictionary (or in Justice 
Scalia’s case, his own intuitions about language) and treating one of 
the definitions as though it sets forth necessary and sufficient 
conditions that, when met, guarantee membership in the category 
represented by the word.204 The resulting decision may sometimes be 
correct, in the sense that the result in the case corresponds with the 
ordinary meaning of the language, but it will not be based on an 
accurate understanding of language. 
B. Proposed Corpus Analyses of the Hypothetical 
Fortunately, the meaning of vehicle presents an issue of lexical 
semantics to which corpus analysis can be applied. Despite the 
seemingly clear issue of meaning Hart’s simple statute presents, 
however, the corpus analysis is not straightforward. The 
differentiation of (suspected) near synonyms (relevant in the Costello 
analysis) or the classification of arguments with which, for instance, a 
verb is used (relevant in the Smith analysis), are by now well-
established matters in corpus linguistics. The situation is different, 
though, when it comes to determining the extension of a category 
such as that denoted by vehicle to determine whether a certain object 
in question (e.g., a Segway or a lawnmower) would fall under the 
category label. The initial, and intuitive, idea of retrieving sentences 
such as “[some noun] is a vehicle” to obtain a truly comprehensive 
set of objects that count as vehicles seems bound to fail in all but the 
 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 204.  For a critique of such practice see SOLAN, supra note 87, at 50–80. 
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largest corpora. As a result, a more sophisticated approach is needed. 
We outline some proposals below. 
It seems advisable to approach category extension by recognizing 
that the notion of a corpus can refer to more than collections of texts 
(written or transcribed spoken data that occurred naturally) in 
(Unicode) text that may feature linguistic annotation. For instance, 
there is nothing that rules out extending the notion of corpus to 
include auditory data (spoken language) and textual data (written 
language) as well as visual data (in the form of images). Textual data 
are also processed visually, even if they are visual representations of a 
conventionalized set of symbols. For example, the linguist Levshina 
discusses a study that consisted of the following steps: 
(1) the compilation of a corpus of images labeled as Stuhl 
(German for chair) and Sessel (German for armchair) from 
online furniture catalogs; 
(2) their annotation for a variety of features describing their 
physical and functional characteristics; 
(3) the computation of a multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA), which explores the multi-feature annotation of 
images for commonalities/correlations and returns 
dimensions that underlie, and hopefully motivate in an 
interpretable way, the distinction of, in this case, Stuhl 
and Sessel.205 
It would be methodologically straightforward to apply a similar 
logic to concepts such as vehicle by annotating images of vehicles and 
other things (as a control group) for features and then have an MCA 
determine which features or dimensions distinguish vehicles from 
semantically neighboring terms. Doing so might reveal that while a 
lawnmower, for example, has wheels and is operated by a human, it 
does not transport humans or goods (at least not as its primary 
purpose) and, thus, should not be considered a vehicle. This method 
is potentially laborious and time-consuming, but once features and 
data are chosen, it is objective and replicable. Furthermore, the 
categorization of images and photos by ordinary users of the 
 
 205.  See NATALIA LEVSHINA, HOW TO DO LINGUISTICS WITH R: DATA EXPLORATION 
AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (2015). 
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Internet is, arguably, less likely to deviate from ordinary usage than 
what a judge makes up in his or her chambers. 
Another method would involve linguistically and psychologically 
more sophisticated ways of operationalizing the notions of category 
membership and prototypicality. For instance, frequency can, but 
need not, be a good predictor of prototypicality.206 However, not 
only is it useful to add dispersion to this definition, but some 
linguists, psychologists, and many other cognitive scientists also 
argue that a prototype is better defined as an abstract entity that 
consists of the combination of the most salient attributes of the 
category. The most salient attributes for a category are those with a 
high cue validity for the category.207 The cue validity of an attribute 
A of object X with regard to a category C is the conditional 
probability of X being a member of category C if or given that X has 
attribute A: p(C|A). In other words, a robin (the object X) is a 
“good” bird (the category C) because it has many of the attributes 
A1-n that are highly predictive of something being a bird (e.g., if 
something has a beak (A1), it is most likely a bird; if something (also) 
has feathers (A2), it is most likely a bird), not because we encounter 
it so frequently or talk about it so frequently (although frequency 
and even dispersion may of course help in making something 
seem  prototypical).208 
Based on the analysis above, the question of what falls within the 
category of ‘vehicle’ can be approached both corpus-linguistically 
and experimentally. One can retrieve clauses such as “[some noun] is 
a vehicle” from a hopefully large and representative corpus, not to 
sample all of the nouns one obtains as a set of category members, 
but rather to note the attributes they possess and compute the cue 
validities of those attributes for the category ‘vehicle.’ Armed with 
these, we can compose a prototype of the category ‘vehicle.’ We can 
also quantify for every entity we consider a candidate for category 
membership—Segways, golf carts, scooters, etc.—both how many 
attributes of the category ‘vehicle’ it possesses, and their cue 
 
 206.  See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (discussing frequency). 
 207.  See Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND 
CATEGORIZATION 27, 27–48 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd eds., 1978); John R. Taylor, 
Prototype Theory, in 1 SEMANTICS 643, 643–64 (Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger & 
Paul Portner eds., 2011). 
 208.  For an explanation of dispersion see supra note 172. 
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validities. On those grounds, one is likely to find that a Tesla Model 
S is a vehicle even though it does not have an internal combustion 
engine and that a baby stroller is probably not a vehicle even though 
though it has four wheels and conveys a passenger. Experimental 
data from psycholinguistic testing can enhance such corpus data by 
helping validate attributes’ relevance for categories or by providing 
examples of vehicles that the corpus data did not provide. 
While the above suggestions are programmatic at this stage, they 
do indicate that corpus-linguistic methods (as well as complementary 
methods from neighboring disciplines) can provide data that is 
relevant to enduring issues of statutory interpretation like the 
fuzziness inherent in natural language words such as vehicle. Such 
data is certainly more accurate than the unsupported intuitions relied 
on by Justice Scalia in his analysis.209 Nevertheless, as in the cases 
analyzed earlier, we do not claim that corpus analysis should by itself 
set the meaning of a statute. A court may well rely on some extra-
textual inference from context that may shape whatever meaning of 
vehicle it adopts. For example, a court may, and often does, adopt a 
meaning based on some circumstance relevant to the purpose of the 
statute. For example, a judge might believe that ambulances and 
other emergency vehicles fall under the ordinary meaning of vehicle 
but may be convinced that they should not be excluded from the 
park in Hart’s hypothetical). Such examples do not undermine the 
general notion that corpus analysis can help a judge decide whether a 
certain definition is compatible with the ordinary meaning of vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of interpretive method-
ologies and the importance of pragmatic inferences from context 
(which are often intertwined with legal concerns), the ordinary 
meaning doctrine is a fundamental aspect of legal interpretation. As 
such, the semantic meanings of words act as a constraint on 
permissible interpretations, making linguistic insights from corpora 
relevant to the questions courts explicitly or implicitly ask when 
interpreting legal texts. Because ordinary meaning must in some 
sense be generalizable across contexts, not shaped by legal concerns, 
 
 209.  See supra notes 194–202 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia’s analysis 
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it would seem to be subject in some way to the empirical verification 
that corpus analysis can provide. 
Nevertheless, it is important to properly assess the limitations of 
a determinant of meaning like corpus analysis that cannot account 
for the full context of the relevant statute. Its inability to take into 
account the full context of a statute means that corpus analysis 
cannot by itself provide conclusive meanings to legal texts. Unlike 
some other determinants of meaning such as legislative history, the 
main function of corpus analysis is to provide data about word 
meanings that cut across contexts. While such information can of 
course be useful, meaning is often fixed in other ways, such as 
through consideration of the structure or context of the relevant 
statute. Furthermore, corpus analysis cannot answer inherently 
normative questions such as the proper standard for designating 
some permissible meaning as the ordinary meaning. Instead, it can 
only provide data relevant to whatever standard is set by courts. 
Even though corpus linguistics can provide linguistic facts useful 
to legal interpretation, a fair amount of sophistication is needed in 
order to perform the work competently. Judges are experts in 
interpreting the law, but such knowledge is orthogonal to corpus 
linguistics. An understanding of how law functions and the role of 
interpretive principles (many of which reflect legal concerns and 
values) does not make a judge (or legal scholar) an expert in the 
academic field of linguistics. The training of linguists often involves 
methods specifically designed to identify and describe the meaning of 
expressions and how to experimentally and statistically counter 
cognitive biases. Judges and lawyers do not currently receive such 
training. Not surprisingly, judges frequently make basic mistakes 
about how language functions (let alone mistakes concerning 
sophisticated linguistic methodologies).210 To think that lawyers and 
judges can easily obtain the necessary corpus linguistics knowledge 
brings to mind Tushnet’s “the ‘lawyer as astrophysicist’ assumption,” 
whereby he criticizes the oft-prevalent notion among lawyers and 
legal academics that “the generalist training of lawyers allows any 
 
 210.  See generally SOLAN, supra note 10 (describing judicial mistakes regarding both 
basic and difficult issues of language). 
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lawyer to read a text on astrophysics over the weekend and launch a 
rocket on Monday.”211 
At this time, it is highly doubtful that the cost-benefit analysis of 
acquiring the knowledge necessary to perform corpus linguistics 
competently favors widespread judicial adoption. Nevertheless, 
publicizing the kind of knowledge that can be gained from linguistic 
work may encourage judges to avail themselves of the services of 
linguists or, more likely, gain a greater understanding of the nature 
and functioning of language. Just as legal practitioners defer to 
expert witnesses when it comes to such things as fingerprinting and 
analyzing genetic information, legal practitioners could similarly 
defer to experts who can testify about language meaning. The 
potential judicial adoption of interdisciplinary knowledge and 
techniques from fields such as linguistics is intriguing, and the 
resulting discussions from such proposals may well serve to enhance 
both the theory and practice of legal interpretation. 
  
 
 211.  Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public 
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979). 
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